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Abstract  
The aim of this dissertation was to ascertain whether the opinions of Portuguese academic 
economists regarding the recent (and still on-going) economic crisis vary according to the 
schools of thought economists claim following. 
This analysis contributes to the current stock of knowledge on the relation of policy and schools 
of thought and it is of particular importance given the lack of studies published about the 
relation and the implications that such knowledge has to understand economic policy 
implications. 
The opinions regarding the causes for the economic decline and the policies for overcoming that 
decline were gathered through an online questionnaire which was sent to 1986 academics 
actively researching in economic related subjects. A total of 417 answers were received (21% 
response rate), with a third of the academics claiming do not possessing any specific 
methodological orientation whereas, among others, 12.5% identify themselves as Neoclassical, 
11.3% as Eclectics, 11.8% as Behavioralists, 7.9% as Institutionalist / New Institutionalist, and 
6.7% New Keynesians.  
Based on descriptive, exploratory and causality analyses, we found that:  
i) Mainstream and heterodox economists differ regarding their individual characteristics - albeit 
gender and academic position do not discriminate between mainstream and non-mainstream 
academics, logistic estimation reveal that non-mainstream respondents are older, have a more 
theoretical approach to research and are less market oriented than their mainstream counterparts.  
ii) For a large share of the Portuguese academic economists, and to a larger extent in the case of 
non-mainstream economists, the increase in poverty and the increase in unemployment are a 
materialization of the economic decline of a country.  
iii) Both mainstream and non-mainstream disagree more on the causes of the current economic 
crisis than on the policies to overcome such crisis.  
iv) The vast majority of the respondents consider the economy’s ‘structural characteristics’ as 
the first or second most important for explaining Portugal’s economic backwardness. Within the 
economy’s structural characteristics, the poor quality of public institutions (including, 
bureaucracy, justice and regulators), and though in lesser extent, the ‘high levels of corruption’ 
and ‘the low level of competition, the existence of barriers to firms to operate and rent seeking 
activities’, are seen as the most important catalysts of the current crisis. 
v) Heterodox/non-mainstream academics, to a larger extend than their mainstream counterparts, 
tend to propose policies that encompass increases of investment in physical infrastructures, 
public investment in strategic sectors, investment in ICT by firms, modification in the 
productive specialization of the economy, and to encourage public research. Mainstream 
academics are also quite distinctive from the remaining individuals as a larger proportion of 
them see further privatizations and the reduction of the power of the unions as important policy 
measures to overcome performance weaknesses of the Portuguese economy. 
iv) Between differences among schools of thought reveal that respondents disagree less on the 
policy proposals to overcome the Portuguese crisis than on the causes that led to the current 
state of affairs. In terms of within differences, we found that non-mainstream / heterodox 
respondents are in more agreement with each other than their mainstream counterparts and that 
disagreement within groups is always lower on policy proposals than on causes. 
Keywords: Schools of thought; Economic policy; Mainstream economics; Heterodox 
economics; Economic crisis 
JEL-Codes: N00 – B4 – B5   
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Resumo 
O objetivo desta dissertação foi o de verificar se as opiniões dos economistas académicos 
portugueses quanto à recente (e ainda em curso) crise económica variam de acordo com as 
escolas de pensamento economistas afirmam seguir. 
Esta análise contribui para o conhecimento sobre a relação da política e escolas de pensamento e 
é de particular importância dada a falta de estudos publicados sobre a relação e as implicações 
que esse conhecimento tem na compreensão das implicações de política económica. 
As opiniões sobre as causas para o declínio económico e as políticas para a superação desse 
declínio foram recolhidas através de um questionário online que foi enviado a 1.986 académicos 
que investigam ativamente em assuntos económicos. Um total de 417 respostas foram recebidas 
(taxa de resposta de 21%), com um terço dos académicos a afirmar não possuir qualquer 
orientação metodológica específica e, entre outros, 12,5% identificam-se como neoclássicos, 
11,3% como Eclécticos, 11,8% como Comportamentalistas, 7,9% como institucionalistas / 
Novos institucionalistas, e 6,7% Novos keynesianos. 
Com base em análises descritivas, exploratórias e de causalidade, verificou-se que: 
i) Os economistas mainstream e heterodoxos diferem quanto suas características individuais - 
ainda que de género e posição académica não discriminem entre académicos mainstream e 
heterodoxos, estimativas logísticas revelam que os inquiridos não-mainstream são mais velhos, 
têm uma abordagem de investigação mais teórica e são menos orientados para o mercado do que 
seus homólogos mainstream. 
ii) Para uma grande parte dos economistas académicos portugueses, e em maior medida no caso 
dos economistas não-mainstream, o aumento da pobreza e do desemprego são a materialização 
do declínio económico de um país. 
iii) Mainstream e non-mainstream discordam mais sobre as causas da atual crise económica do 
que sobre as políticas para superar essa mesma crise. 
iv) A grande maioria dos inquiridos consideram as ‘características estruturais’ da economia 
como a primeira ou a segunda mais importante causa para explicar o atraso económico de 
Portugal. Dentro de características estruturais da economia, a baixa qualidade das instituições 
públicas (incluindo, a burocracia, a justiça e os reguladores) e, embora em menor medida, dos 
altos níveis de corrupção, o baixo nível de concorrência, e a existência de barreiras para as 
empresas, são considerados como os mais importantes catalisadores da atual crise. 
v) Os académicos heterodoxos / não-mainstream, mais do que os seus homólogos mainstream, 
tendem a propor políticas que envolvem aumentos de investimento em infra-estruturas físicas, o 
investimento público em setores estratégicos, o investimento em TIC por parte das empresas, a 
modificação na especialização produtiva da economia, e o incentivo à investigação pública. Os 
académicos mainstream também são bastante distintos dos demais indivíduos como uma 
proporção maior deles a considerar mais privatizações e a redução do poder dos sindicatos 
como medidas políticas importantes para superar as fraquezas da economia Portuguesa. 
iv) As diferenças entre escolas de pensamento revelam que os inquiridos discordam menos 
sobre as propostas de políticas para superar a crise Portuguesa do que sobre as causas que 
levaram ao estado atual das coisas. Em termos de diferenças dentro de cada escola de 
pensamento, constatamos que os inquiridos não-mainstream / heterodoxos estão em maior 
concordância uns com os outros do que os seus congéneres mainstream e que a discordância 
dentro dos grupos é sempre menor no que respeita às propostas políticas do que as relativas às 
causas. 
Palavras-chave: Escolas de pensamento: política económica; economia mainstream; economia 
heterodoxa; crises económicas 
Códigos JEL: N00 – B4 – B5 
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1. Introduction 
Different schools of thought often assume a different ontological view about the world 
(see, for instance, Backhouse (2000a), Lawson (1994, 2013), Palley (2007), Vromen 
(2012) or Witt (2008)). Studies, in general, present quite different approaches to explain 
reality, which are related to a large extent to the corresponding authors’ school of 
thought.  
Figuring who belongs where is always a motive for discussion and criticism. The task at 
hands is not an easy one. Restraining the analysis to assess ontological and 
methodological positions of each school and their primary level of policy, in other 
words, how they view the world and how they propose to change something about it (if 
there is something to be changed), we might consider two approaches.  
One way to tackle the problem would be to take a view similar to Lakatos (1982), 
considering various ‘scientific research programs’ that compete with each other. Each 
program is composed from three dimensions, a ‘hard core’, a negative heuristic and a 
positive heuristic. A negative heuristic establishes what the ‘hard core’ in the research 
is, and this core must be defended to the limit with ingenious ‘auxiliary hypotheses.’ 
The positive heuristic relates to how these ‘auxiliary hypotheses’ should evolve (how 
the researchers investigate and create new knowledge). Lakatos sees these ‘scientific 
research programs’ as having well defined frontiers and competing with each other. 
Some issues with this proposal arise concerning the rigidity of the frontiers – such 
rigidity does not allow many theories to become independent ‘scientific research 
program.’  
Another approach, which we consider more appealing, is Hoover’s (1991) tribal 
categorization. This proposal takes some models as ‘exemplars’ and the tribe would be 
composed with similar ‘family’ models. One difference in this analysis is that the 
frontiers are not well defined. There are a core of models which we can affirm with 
security that belong with some ‘family’ but others lie in the frontiers and have shared 
elements with one or more ‘families.’ This analysis enables us to provide a broader 
picture to economics’ schools of thought without limiting ourselves to too rigid 
frontiers. 
In modern times, the economics’ objects of study are vast. So much as so, it would help 
to remember some words by Joseph Schumpeter (in Backhouse (2002: 321-322): 
 2 
The more we approach modern times the less possible it becomes to characterize briefly the 
wealth of currents and cross-currents and the more untrue, forced and misleading appears 
any systematic arrangement and grouping… We must add that hand in hand with the 
progressing specialization resulting from the increase of the subject-matter and from the 
advances in analysis, which turned many of the best workers into laymen in all branches 
except their own special ones, a tendency established itself in most recent times to break 
down the barriers between the various specialized branches.  
These words proclaimed more than a century ago, are still very relevant, if not more, 
today. The analysis laid below covers a large ground of the field of economics and some 
schools of thought are not necessarily in competition with each other, as mentioned 
above, and cover different areas of research. Having these considerations it is 
impossible to cover all the areas of research in this study.  
In the area of economics (but not only), public authorities, in general, and politicians in 
particular, often ask for recommendations to researchers/academics.
1
 Thus, one might 
conjecture that economists’ ontological viewpoints would impact on the policies these 
economists might recommend and/or thought as relevant in a context of a particular 
problem. Consequently, knowing the prevalent school of thought might be an indicator 
to what future implemented policies will be. 
The issue of which economic policies are to be implemented has been a particularly hot 
topic in the context of the southern European economies, most notably Italy, Greece, 
Portugal or Spain, which have been strongly hit by the financial crises and where 
austerity measures supported, mainly by mainstream viewpoints, have been 
implemented, not without a fierce discontent among several fractions of the society, 
namely the heterodox economists (Teixeira et al., 2014). In Portugal, for instance, 
several movements emerged, including, in 2014, the ‘Manifesto dos 70’. This manifest 
questioned mainstream, liberal policies implemented to fight country’s public debt and 
external account imbalances. This Manifesto was also signed by 74 foreign economists, 
including the Danish economist Bengt-Åke Lundvall, a well renowned heterodox 
economist. He emphatically added, when questioned on why he signed the Manifesto, 
that “it would signal a protest against the dictatorship of ‘the market’ and against what 
I see as misdirected austerity policies in Europe”, and further established that “[a]fter 
the 2008 crisis it has become even more clear that economic policy has become 
                                                     
1
 In Portugal, a large number of Finance and Economics Ministers came from the academia: for instance, 
the present (2015) Minister Maria Luís Albuquerque was a professor until 2006. Her predecessor, Vítor 
Gaspar, has several scientific publications and is currently affiliated with the ECB. Before, Fernando 
Teixeira dos Santos is and was a professor of economics at the University of Porto. To give a final 
example, Luís Campos e Cunha is a professor at Universidade Nova in Lisbon. 
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subordinate to ‘the market’ and what is presented as ‘the necessary policy’ – 
sometimes referred to as the competitiveness pact – results in an increase rather than a 
reduction in the gaps in welfare between the North and South of Europe.” (emphasis 
added).
2
 
The literature is rather scarce about associating different schools of thought to 
economists’ opinions on policies. The only published paper we know of, besides Di 
Maio’s (2013), is that from De Benedictis and Di Maio (2011). The study of Di Maio 
(2013) explicitly addresses the above mentioned issue. Specifically, based on a sample 
of 335 Italian academic economists, Di Maio (2013) assesses whether there are 
differences between heterodox and mainstream economists. The author concluded that 
such differences exist as to their individual and academic characteristics and political 
views, including their views on core economic policies. However, and rather 
unexpectedly, he found that there is less disagreement within heterodox economists than 
mainstream economists. Globally, Di Maio found that individual opinions do not seem 
to be explained by common grouping of heterodox or mainstream schools of thought. In 
Di Maio’s study respondents self-identify their schools of thought. 
Being Portugal, as Italy, a Southern European country where austerity, market driven 
policy measures have been fiercely contested, namely by academics, it would be 
interesting to assess the extent to which results differ or are similar to those found in 
Italy.  
In the present dissertation, we follow Di Maio’s (2013) study, implementing it in a pool 
of Portuguese academic economists, identifying which schools of thought are 
predominant in the Portuguese academia and associate each school of thought to 
different opinions about economic policies and the reasons/causes, according to those 
same economists, for the crises and the Portuguese economy’s current, cyclical and 
structural state.  
In methodological terms, we resort to quantitative descriptive and causality methods, 
gathering the data through a national wide survey to all academic researchers in 
Portugal affiliated in the 14 public universities.  
                                                     
2
 In http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2014/03/27/bengt-ake-lundvall-the-portuguese-manifesto-could-become-a-
trigger-for-change/, accessed on January 2015. 
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The present dissertation is structured as follows. In the next section, a literature review 
on the different schools of thought within economics is performed. Then, in Section 3, 
the methodology is described. In Section 4 we present the analysis of the results. 
Finally, in Section 5 we conclude the study.  
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2. Literature review on the different schools of thought within 
economics 
2.1. Mainstream Economics 
There is a debate about what is mainstream and what is orthodox (see for example 
Colander et al., 2004 or Dequech, 2007). Orthodox, according to Colander et al. (2004), 
is a “backward looking term” that represents the state of the art at a given point in time. 
Differently, mainstream, according to the same authors, refers to “the ideas that are held 
by those individuals who are dominant in the leading academic institutions, 
organizations, and journals at any given time, especially the leading graduate research 
institutions.” (Colander et al., 2004: 490). In this regard, orthodoxy refers to an 
intellectual state (based on concepts) whereas mainstream refers to a sociological state 
(based on the composition of the groups). The ideas dominant at one point in time, by 
the elite, do not necessarily reflect the leading concepts of the science, so these two 
terms are conceptually different.  
Assuming that all schools of thought are, at the present, at the edge of the science in 
their areas of study, what separates them is how widespread their ideas are at the policy 
and academic level. We use the classification provided in Colander et al. (2004) plus 
Lawson’s (2013) classification. Lawson states that the modern mainstream is composed 
by “an overly taxonomic approach to science, a group dominated in modern times by 
those that accept mathematical deductivism as an orientation to science for us all, and 
(…) effectively regard any stance that questions this approach, whatever the basis, as 
inevitably misguided” (Lawson, 2013: 978). Lawson’s argument has implicitly the 
concept of orthodox referred by Colander et al. (2004). He separates heterodox from the 
mainstream based on a methodological approach (which we can infirm is a conceptual 
differentiation).  
In the present study, we consider mainstream not only being composed by the 
sociological states but with conceptual states as well. Crossing the differentiation from 
Lawson (2013) and the concept of mainstream from Colander et al. (2004), what is 
considered, in the present study, the (modern) mainstream economics is the group of 
ideas that are dominant in academic and policy organizations which seek to describe the 
events of reality recurring mostly to mathematical deductivism.  
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Different schools of thought have distinct ontological views. Lawson (2013) argues that 
one problem with modern economics is their methodological and social ontological 
stance. He continues arguing that mainstream economics relies on tradition and the 
repeated use of mathematical models, and those models have assumptions that do not 
confer to the nature of the reality and “[t]he defining feature of the mainstream is the 
insistence on methods of mathematical modelling” (Lawson, 2013: 957). Since 
mathematical models are composed by system(s) of equations, it is necessary that all the 
variables and relations between them are known or the system is not analytical 
determinable. This is what distinguishes mainstream from heterodox; mainstream 
models need to be closed systems (Dow, 2000).  
A further and pertinent reference to mainstream economics is instrumentalism. 
Instrumentalism affirms that theories are neither true nor false, they are just an 
instrument and are useful as long as they fulfill an adequate result, in other words, as 
long as they can explain some phenomenon (Caldwell, 1980). The foremost text in 
economics is Friedman’s (1953) Essays in Positive Economics. In it, Friedman defends 
this view. Not only he argues that we cannot state if a hypothesis is true or not, he also 
adds, that it does not matter if the hypothesis is false as long the predictions are 
“sufficiently accurate” (Friedman, 1953: 9). This leads to the ‘as if’ statements. It does not 
matter if the individual does or does not behave as the assumptions state, but if the effect 
of the behavior (what we can see) is the effect that would result if in fact the individual 
behaved as the assumption then, Friedman states, the assumption is acceptable (Boland, 
1979). This ‘as if’ statements are of utmost importance because it is one of the reasons 
mathematical insistence, as Lawson argues, is pursued.   
Below we describe the principal schools in this section (following Dequech’s (2007) 
analysis) - Table 1 provides a synthetic overview of these schools.
3
 We start with 
neoclassical economics (which appeared in the 19
th
 century) and then we move in two 
different directions showing, on one hand, the advances in macroeconomic theory after 
1970s and, on the other, discussing an emerging field that seeks to understand how 
individual make choices, behavioral economics, which is an interdisciplinary field 
combining economics and psychology. We consider an emerging area of research 
started in evolutionary biology as mainstream, which is evolutionary game theory. 
                                                     
3
 Dequech considers that mainstream is composed mostly from neoclassical economics. He considers 
additional schools as behavioral economics, experimental economics, new institutional economics and 
evolutionary game theory. We however, introduce new institutional economics in the heterodox category.  
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2.1.1. Neoclassical Economics 
Neoclassical economics was first coined by Veblen (Lawson, 2013).
4
 There seems to be 
a disagreement to the beginning of this school, some put it in the 1870s, with the 
marginalists, Jevons and Menger and later at the turn of the century with Marshall’s 
synthesis of their work. Others include previous works like Cournot and Dupuit in the 
1840s. The synthesis of this school appears in two books, Hicks’s Value and Capital 
(1939) and Samuelson’s Foundations (1947).5 The neoclassical synthesis, as was 
named, viewed prices as perfectly flexible in the long run with competitive markets in 
equilibrium, however, in the short run prices and wages were viewed as given (Dixon, 
2008). 
The central concept to begin the analysis of this school of thought is scarcity. The ‘Law 
of Scarcity’ (Samuelson, 1955) states that since goods are not infinite and needs for 
consumption increase with the wealth of individuals there is always scarcity. If no 
goods were relatively scarce then there would be no need to have a discipline called 
economics. As Panayotakis points (referring to neoclassical economics), it is this 
concept that gives a reason for the existence of the economics. Moreover, scarcity 
serves to legitimize the concept of the “capitalist socio-economic system” (Panayotakis, 
2013: 184). The emphasis of this school is at the individual level where he is viewed as 
a possessor of farsighted rationality (assumption necessary to maximize his utility) and 
decides on the margin. The analysis is predominantly micro based and when there is a 
necessity to study aggregate variables, usually a homogeneous agent is considered and 
individual rationality, through a process of aggregation through a market process, 
becomes a ‘social rationality’(Colander, 2000: 134). Synthesizing, as Weintraub (2002, 
in Lawson, 2013: 949) focuses on three points that make this school different than 
others: “1. People have rational preferences among outcomes. 2. Individuals maximize 
utility and firms maximize profits. 3. People act independently on the basis of full and 
                                                     
4
 In this article Lawson refers to what Veblen meant with the term neoclassical economics. Veblen 
distinguishes between a taxonomic science and an evolutionary or ´modern science´. Not that taxonomy 
does not matter but “taxonomy for taxonomy´s sake, definition and classification for the sake of 
definition and classification, meets no need of modern science” (Veblen, 1908: 113). As evolutionary he 
refers to the causal sequence of events. He states that neoclassical economics is caught between the two 
as will be shown later.      
5
 See Colander (2000) for a collection of the authors that proclaim these arguments. 
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relevant information. Theories based on, or guided by, these assumptions are 
neoclassical theories”.6  
Some authors that consider that the neoclassical period ends with the two books referred 
earlier but Lawson (2013) arguments differently. Lawson refers methodological 
questions to refute the claims about the end of the neoclassical period. For this author, 
neoclassical economics is composed by “those who are aware (at some level) that social 
reality is of a causal-processual nature as elaborated above, who prioritise the goal of 
being realistic, and yet who fail themselves fully to recognise or to accept the limited 
scope for any overly-taxonomic approach including, in particular, one that makes 
significant use of methods of mathematical deductive modelling” (Lawson, 2013: 979).7 
Lawson concludes that this is the most coherent interpretation of the term and points to 
the inconsistencies.
8
 In a similar view, Clark adds that neoclassical economics adopts 
the ‘rational economic individual’ as its primary heuristic, and that for this very reason 
the analysis of reality excludes topics such as “history, culture, politics, and religion, 
leaving only autonomous individuals with preferences and factor endowments searching 
for trading opportunities” (Clark, 2014: 138). Further, he explores an analogy between 
this school of thought and faith and states that neoclassical economics is a “competing 
faith” to Christianity but the emphasis is at the individual level instead of a union (with 
God) and that this individual emphasis is insufficient to explain economic reality.  
To finalize, the term neoclassical economics is not dead, although some defend it should 
(for example, Colander (2000) defends this and points to other authors who do the same 
as it can be a misleading term) and does not constitute the whole of mainstream but is 
an important part of it. 
 
                                                     
6
 Another reference is Gary Becker who wrote that the economic approach is formed by “the combined 
assumptions of maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and 
unflinchingly” Becker (1976: 5). 
7
 In this article Lawson considers three groups to characterize modern economics regarding their 
methodological stance. The first one is composed by most modern mainstream economics, and the second 
one is composed by the “core of modern heterodoxy”. In the former are the ones that adopt mathematical 
deductivism and disregard any attempts to question this methodology. The latter are the ones that being 
aware of the “causal-processual” nature of reality adjust the method used to being the more realistic 
possible. The third one encompasses neoclassical economics.   
8
 Using inappropriate deductivistic mathematical models to explain a causal-processual reality.  
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Table 1: An Overview of Mainstream’s Schools of Thought  
 
Neoclassical 
Economics 
New Keynesian 
Economics 
Behavioral 
Economics 
Central Problems Scarcity 
Unemployment and real effects of nominal 
variables 
Individual Behavior 
Solution Efficiency Monetary Policy Correct behavior deficiencies 
Level of Analysis Micro Macro Micro  
Agents 
Optimizing agent with rational preferences, 
homogeneous 
Rational and Representative 
Non Rational Behavior, 
Bounded Rationality 
Property of Markets Equilibrium Equilibrium Disequilibrium 
Archetypical 
Individuals 
Paul Samuelson, Leon Walras, Gary Becker David Romer, Joseph Stiglitz  Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman 
Idiosyncratic Terms Marginal, Equilibrium, Rationality Money, Interest Rate, Monetary Policy 
Behavior, Rationality, Choice  
Heuristics 
Important Journals 
American Economic Review, Journal of 
Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Journal of Economic Literature, 
Review of Economic Studies 
- 
Journal of Socio Economics, Journal of Economic 
Psychology, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 
Methodologies (or 
Heuristics) 
Mathematical Modeling - Inductive / Descriptive approach 
Ontological 
Considerations 
Empirical Realism 
Classical dichotomy fails /  non walrasian 
features of the economy 
- 
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Several long run growth models were formulated following this line of thought. Two 
notable mentions are the Solow model
9
 and the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model. 
Although the (necessarily) strict scope of the present dissertation does not involve the 
detailed  explanation of these models, we nevertheless thought important to synthesize 
the predictions the models yield (following Romer (2006)), most notably the Solow 
model, as they have been extensively used to predict countries’ growth rates due to 
passing Kaldor’s stylized facts.  
The Ramsey’s model predicts the same as the Solow’s model does in the balanced 
growth path (the path the economy follows once all variables have reached their steady 
state values), but it endogenizes the saving rate. The conclusions of both models are that 
the economy grows at the rate of the population growth plus the rate of “technical 
progress.” This demonstrates how neoclassical economics perceives reality and hpw 
ingenious it was as to simplify the complex reality and describe it in a simple fashion. 
Such outcome might lead to think that policy intervention is not necessary because the 
policy maker power to shape the evolution of these variables (population growth and 
technical progress) is limited. However, this school of thought forearms the possibility 
of the market not being perfect, a market failure. The way to determine a market failure 
is to assess if at least one of the propositions of the first fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics. The propositions are as follows: “(1) if there are enough markets, (2) if all 
consumers and producers behave competitively, and (3) if an equilibrium exists, then 
the allocation of resources in that equilibrium will be Pareto optimal” (Ledyard, 2008). 
Hence, only in these situations is adequate to intervene at the policy level. 
Assuming Colander’s (2000) argument which considers that modern economics is more 
than what neoclassical economics, below we introduce the developments of the second 
half of the 20
th
 century. We introduce briefly New Classical Economics, New 
Keynesian Economics and, more recently, the convergence in macroeconomic 
theorizing.  
                                                     
9
 The model was originally introduced by Solow (1956). Some important modifications were added to the 
original in Solow (1957) which includes technical progress and, in Mankiw et al. (1992), human capital. 
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2.1.2. New Classical Economics, New Keynesian Economics and the “New 
Neoclassical Synthesis” 
Though the 1970s and the following decade, in an effort to explain macroeconomic 
phenomena, prominent economists emphasized the modeling of the economy with the 
assumptions of market clearing and agents’ economic optimization (Fischer, 2008). The 
hypotheses, in the interpretation given by this line of thought, are not “realistic” – in the 
sense that they can be observed and verified – but the results can be predicted with 
some accuracy. Friedman explains that the underlying hypotheses of a theory do not 
need to be true (in fact, he argues, the more important an hypotheses is, the less realistic 
it becomes because it explains more from less and, thus, that indicates the hypotheses 
were built from “descriptively false” assumptions), and they only need to make 
“sufficiently accurate predictions” (Friedman, 1953: 9).  
The foundations or the hard core of new classical economics include: methodological 
individualism, general equilibrium in the economy, agents have rational expectations 
and economic decisions depend only on real variables and not depend, whatsoever, on 
nominal variables (Hoover, 1991). Although many, if not all, of these propositions are 
not “realistic” they establish the framework to predict human behavior without knowing 
much about it and, as Lucas (1986) argues, this is what gives economics the power it 
has. 
Given that it is not our objective to ascertain if the concept of rational expectations is 
itself a sufficient important concept to render this school (new classical economics) an 
entirely different school (from neoclassical), in the present dissertation we consider 
neoclassical and new classical economics as the same.
10
 Specifically, we view new 
classical economics school as an “evolution” of neoclassical economics. On this note, 
the concept of rational expectations is a fundamental hypothesis of new classical school. 
It states that agents’ predictions about future economic variables are the same, on 
average, to the predictions of the model about the same variables (Muth, 1961), in other 
words, agents are correct on average. 
An extreme form of viewing the business cycle (fluctuations of the output over a period 
of time) is proposed initially by proponents of this school and is denominated as ‘Real 
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 The reader can compare the basic assumptions of the two schools to see their likeness. This note is 
important because in Section 4 we only consider neoclassical economics and do not give this as an option 
to the target subjects of our survey.  
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Business Cycle’ (RBC). Its basic assumptions are: “the models are built from up from 
microeconomic foundation; they are entirely Walrasian; agents are intertemporal 
optimizers; and agents’ success is assessed through the sort of qualitative calibration 
exercises” (Romer, 2006: 179). In this line of thinking, what fluctuates is the real output 
(for the new Keynesian what fluctuates is the nominal output – see below) and the main 
causes for the variation are technological shocks. Since these are real shocks and the 
economy is Walrasian, the movements are the agents’ best response to the shock and 
they are Pareto optimal.  
The model has significant implications for policy proposals. For instance, since the 
economy is, in every moment, in a Pareto optimum, any policy measure (be it fiscal or 
monetary) can only worsen the situation and, different from neoclassical economics, 
there can be no market failures (Romer, 2006). It leaves the policy makers little room to 
intervene except in the case where it improves the technological conditions of the 
economy. 
New Keynesian economics appears as an advancement to what dominated 
macroeconomic policy starting in the 1950s through 1970s, the neo-Keynesian 
economics. In this view, the central problems studied are at the macro level, usually 
related to the relation between inflation, money supply and output, and there is a strong 
relevance with the so called micro foundations to explain these relations (Gali and 
Gertler, 2007; Palley, 2007).
11
 Authors within this school reject the view that the 
economy functions in a Walrasian way.
12
 This implicates that they consider, for 
instance, unemployment as an important phenomenon and ‘nominal’ variables have 
impact on ‘real’ variables, at least in the ‘short run’ (i.e., the classical dichotomy 
fails).
13
 The argument is presented as: if ‘nominal’ variables impact ‘real’ variables, 
then there must be some rigidity of real variables (Romer, 1993).
14
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 Contrary to early Keynesians, which looked at the macro variables and their relations alone, New 
Keynesians seek to understand how macro variables are formed at the micro level and extrapolate to the 
macro level from them.  
12
 In a Walrasian economy, we have perfect competition in goods and labor markets, no externalities and 
perfect information. 
13
 In a different version of the New Keynesian approach (see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993)) it is 
defended that even if prices and wages were completely flexible (in other words, the classical dichotomy 
is preserved) monetary policy has real effects. In this view, flexibility of prices and wages amplifies the 
economy’s shocks creating high volatile variations in output and employment. 
14
 If real variables are perfectly and instantly adjusted to some phenomenon then nominal variables would 
not interfere on them. If, for example, money supply doubled, prices would double too and all the relative 
prices would be the same. 
 13 
The “micro foundations” referred earlier are composed by nominal frictions (or price 
stickiness) and real rigidities. Blinder’s (1994) survey for the USA ranks the most 
important nominal stickiness reasons as follows: “Coordination failure” (firms wait for 
each other to change prices), “cost based pricing with lags” (prices only rise after costs 
have risen), “delivery lags” (firms prefer to change other variables than price, such as 
delivery times, product quality, etc.) and “implicit contracts” (firms stabilize prices to 
be fair with customers).  
Some potential sources of real rigidity, are the different mechanisms that affect the 
capability of firms buying their inputs selling their outputs during booms or recessions; 
the nature of asymmetrical information between lenders and borrowers in external 
finance of firms; the cyclical behavior of demand elasticity in good markets; and, 
related to labor market, the rigidity is explained by the relatively elastic short run supply 
of labor and/or sticky nominal wages (Romer, 1993). 
New Keynesians have a view on the business cycle which revolves around explaining 
what happens in the economy based on the output gap. They define output gap (which 
does not exist under a Real Business Cycle approach) as the difference between the 
observed output level and the output that could be achieved if the economy operated 
under flexible wages and prices.
15
 But since there is wage and price stickiness, in their 
view, the observed output will deviate most of the time from the optimal and thus, New 
Keynesians argue, monetary policy should be aimed at reproducing the conditions of 
flexible prices and wages (Cukierman, 2005). In this context, central banks have a 
decisive impact on the economy and how it behaves. In Clarida et al. (1999), it is argued 
that the policy should be performed in a way to target inflation, and this is accomplished 
managing short term interest rates, mostly in the interbank overnight lending market. 
The central bank has an utility function, or a welfare function, that serves as guide for 
the instrument of managing short term interest rates and at each moment it chooses the 
triplet (output gap, inflation and short term interest rate) which maximizes that function. 
This policy framework is done in an environment in which the private sector forms 
beliefs rationally (it is used a representative agent and he is rational). One of the results 
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 Shiller (1997) argues that there is a resistance to indexation of future payments. Among many reasons, 
people believe that inflation is harmful to everyone, firms and individuals, and as such refrain from 
indexing contracts to inflation fearing they might not be able to meet the agreements. Another interesting 
reason, inflation is negatively correlated with economic growth after 1970s, which might induce in 
people’s minds further fear as mentioned. Furthermore, lack of indexation could be caused by the 
technical knowledge required to understand the issue or lack of interest in some economic topics.  
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of this explanation (see Clarida et al. (1999) for the mathematical deduction) is the “lean 
against the wind” policy; if inflation is above the target of the central bank, it seeks to 
contract demand below capacity, using the instrument short term interest rate (raising 
it), and vice versa. These actions are performed in a dynamic general equilibrium 
framework (in other words, the model predicts an optimum decision for the central 
bank).     
These last two views presented involve the polarization of what we can do 
methodologically in macroeconomics in the present times. But neither of them captures 
reality in the best way possible. In due course, the macroeconomic analysis employed 
entailed a mixture of both views and was labeled the New Neoclassical Synthesis. As 
Goodfriend and King (1997) declare, this synthesis merge the analysis of intertemporal 
optimization and rational expectations applied using the Keynesian (rigid) pricing and 
output decisions framework. The view encompasses, essentially, the act (or the study 
of) monetary policy and it states four crucial conclusions. First, monetary policy 
impacts on real economic activity and it can persist during several years (Keynesian 
side). Second, in the long run, there does not seem to appear that inflation and real 
activity impact each other (New Classical side). Third, low inflation is preferred due to 
more efficient transactions and less relative price distortions. And fourth, credibility is 
an important factor to grasp the effects of monetary policy (Goodfriend and King, 
1997). 
2.1.3. Behavioral Economics 
The classification of behavioral economics within the mainstream group is debatable. 
On the one side, this school does not pass the criteria we use from Lawson (2013), as it 
does not have an insistence on a mathematical deductive modeling. However, on the 
other side, it appears to be a topic debated in high impact factor journals as the literature 
below illustrates and includes some Nobel laureates as, for instance, Herbert Simon and 
Daniel Kahneman, among their active researchers and proponents. Another point 
favoring the introduction of this school in the mainstream can be captured in the 
following sentence, “[a]s a rule, it is bad to spend time on “methodological” and broad-
stroke issues rather than the nitty gritty of the phenomena being studied. The goal of 
this research program is that it become “normal science”, and, as such, the nitty gritty is 
the point” (Rabin, 2002: 659). Detachment from methodological debate is a common 
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argument used by heterodox economists to identify mainstream economists and one of 
the reasons for the inclusion of this school in this group.
16
 
Having these considerations in mind, behavioral economics is a combination between 
psychology and economics with of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman as the first 
head proponents. The central theme of study in this school relates to human behavior. In 
more depth, it is their understanding that several features of human psychology affect 
decision, and these decisions deviate from the postulated rational expectations 
formulation. In other words, rationality is systematically violated and, moreover, the 
decision errors are predictable and individuals use (simple) heuristics to make decisions 
instead of knowing and evaluating all the possibilities, and thus, the agents are treated 
as having bounded rationality. These heuristics are representativeness, availability and 
anchoring. Representativeness signifies that individuals evaluate an event attending a 
representative in the class of this event. In the availability heuristic, individuals use 
events recalled from mind as a proxy to evaluate the probability of this event and the 
anchoring heuristic refers to the observation that individuals make decisions to some 
reference point.
17
 Some other mainstream economists’ debate that these violations 
cannot be continued practiced because if rationality is consistently being violated then 
arbitrageurs act, gain a profit and the market tends to the state that it would be in case 
everyone was acting rational. DellaVigna (2009) refutes two arguments that defend that 
market forces are sufficient to eliminate “nonstandard behavior.”18 One is that 
accumulated experience is supposed to reduce nonstandard behavior but it does not. The 
other is, even if this experience mentioned does not eliminate the effects of nonstandard 
behavior, these effects do not impact aggregate market outcomes, which DellaVigna 
refutes too. Frederick et al. (2002) explain why the expected utility model is not correct 
to analyze how individuals make intertemporal choices. They refer that individuals have 
decreasing discount rates over time (hyperbolic discounting), “gains are discounted 
more than losses, small amounts more than large amounts, and explicit sequences of 
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 Another factor for the inclusion in mainstream economics, presented in section 4, is the importance of 
this school in the Portuguese academia. 
17
 The relevant literature on these arguments can be found in Laibson and Zeckhauser (1998), Rabin 
(1998), DellaVigna (2009) and references therein. Camerer (1999) relates the rational principle (which he 
treats as a special case) with the behavioral (equivalent) principle (which he considers the general case). 
For example, expected utility is a special case of a more general theory, prospect theory, as is equilibrium 
a special case of continued learning and evolution. These relations are explained from the psychological 
foundations studied. The original article on prospect theory is Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
18
 See the original article for a more detailed explanation. 
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multiple outcomes are discounted differently than outcomes considered singly” 
(Frederick et al., 2002: 360). 
Methodologically, we observe that this school recurs mostly to experiments as “field 
experiments, natural experiments, and inference from menu choice, in addition, of 
course, to the laboratory experiments” (DellaVigna, 2009: 366) based on experimental 
psychology methods and on methods of empirical economics (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). 
Behavioral economics observes how individuals act instead of stating a priori 
assumptions about rationality and aim to model the individuals’ decisions subjacent to 
their cognitive processes (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). A subfield, called neuroeconomics, 
seeks to find answers to some of thematic of behavioral economics; but instead of 
analyzing individual actions they analyze the brain using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). With this method some conclusions can be obtained regarding 
preferences, decision making under uncertainty and risk and game theory and social 
preferences (see, for instance, Camerer (2007); Camerer et al. (2004)).  
At the policy level, Camerer (1999) refers an interesting point. If agents were rational 
there would be no need to policy intervention. But, since they are not, there is scope for 
it. For instance, agents give more importance to present pleasure than to future one 
(they do not use discounted utility but hyperbolic discounting), and so tend to 
impulsively spend more today. One policy proposal would be one that slowed these 
effect and made consumers spend their money more sparsely over time. With the same 
problem in mind, Lynch Jr and Zauberman (2006: 73), and considering “that internal 
self-control and externally induced self-control are substitutable,” defend the 
institutionalization of self-control strategies, i.e., strategies that make people choose in a 
“cold” moment.19 In another article Bertrand et al. (2006) relate the poor with some 
aggressive market campaigns and how these influence the poor’s behavior in a negative 
way. Arguing that cognitive processes and typical financial behaviors matter, they 
conclude that policy aiming at these lower class groups should be done with simplicity, 
persuasion, with detailed program and honesty. Gowdy (2008), discussing how this 
school of thought can aim to provide answers to global climate change, points to two 
considerations: well-being does not rise after certain income per capita; and the human 
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 A “cold” moment is a moment where deprivation of some necessity is absent and the opposed is a “hot” 
moment. In this “hot” moment people tend to choose poorly. For example, a person deprived of nicotine 
(is in a hot state) is much more willing to buy a pack of cigarettes.   
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quality of cooperation (giving as example, the Marshall Plan and the formation of 
NATO).
20
 
2.2. Heterodox economics 
There are several different ways of defining heterodox. We can define heterodoxy 
negatively from orthodoxy or from mainstream (Colander et al., 2004; Dequech, 2007), 
meaning that a heterodox economist is something different from an orthodox or 
mainstream economist. Alternatively, we could apply intellectual criteria to differentiate 
heterodox from orthodox (it would involve the divergence from the orthodox ideas) or 
apply a sociological criteria (we would consider less prestigious ideas for comparison 
(Dequech, 2007)). Defining heterodoxy negatively from orthodoxy or from mainstream 
is too simplistic. It would mean that an heterodox is something that an orthodox is not. 
Comparing heterodox to the definition referred in the mainstream section of orthodox 
would mean that heterodox is composed by conceptually different ideas. This 
corresponds as a positive characterization, in other words, defining heterodoxy based on 
their different concepts or methodology. In this approach, an heterodox economist does 
not follow the same methodologies used by the orthodox group and/or does not have the 
same assumptions about how the world works. As Lawson argues in several articles 
(Lawson, 1994, 2006, 2013) one of the defining characteristics of the mainstream 
approach is the insistence on mathematical deductivism and formal modeling. This 
author proposes that heterodoxy can be identified as “a rejection of this emphasis 
[mathematical modeling]. [Which] does not amount to a rejection of all mathematical–
deductive modelling. But it is a rejection of the insistence that we all always and 
everywhere use it” (Lawson, 2006: 492). He continues, “mathematical methods are 
mostly inappropriate to social analysis that ultimately underpins the heterodox 
opposition. In short, I am contending that the essence of the heterodox opposition is 
ontological in nature” (Lawson, 2006: 493).21 
Complementing Lawson’s differentiation, in the present study, we define each of the 
most prominent schools of thought in the heterodoxy, define conceptually and 
ontologically each of them, and apply the criteria explained by Backhouse (2000b). This 
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 And also critiquing the Kyoto plan. The question is about doing something to show commitment and 
not exactly to define strict objectives. 
21
 See Mearman (2011) and citations therein for a literature selection on heterodoxy. There is not a 
consensual definition of heterodox and many different authors choose different dimensions to define the 
term. In this study, since the initial hypothesis is that ontological differences could be a determinant factor 
for different views of the economists, Lawson’s classification seems more adequate to guide the study.   
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latter author argues that, for an economist to be considered heterodox three criteria must 
be verified (enabling to distinguish him/her from an orthodox or mainstream): self-
identification, sociology and core assumptions. The first refers to a conscious decision 
by the economist to not work in the dominant way in economics. The second one refers 
to the institutionalization of a school of thought “in terms of separate journals, separate 
conferences, who people talk to, and who they cite” (Backhouse, 2000b: 149). The last 
one refers to the different core beliefs that heterodox economists have that will translate 
into different theories about the economy.  
In the next section we discuss the various and most important heterodox schools of 
thought that verify the criteria previously explained: Evolutionary economics; Post 
Keynesian economics; Austrian economics and New Institutional economics (see Table 
2 for a synthesis). 
2.2.1. Evolutionary economics 
The distinguishing feature about this school of thought is its emphasis on the theme of 
innovation. Innovation is defined as a commercial introduction of a new product or 
process (Fagerberg, 2005). Starting with Schumpeter, at the beginning of the 20
th
 
century, a different form of observing economic phenomena emerged. Following the 
work by Walras, he wanted to create a divergent economic theory, not based on static 
equilibrium, but a theory of economic evolution. By evolution Schumpeter meant 
“qualitative, economic change brought about through innovation” (Fagerberg, 2003: 
129). This permanent force to change, fueled by the constant influx of innovations, 
distanced his theory from the neoclassical equilibrium theory. Without innovation the 
economy would tend to a stationary state, portrayed by the models of Walras and others 
and it is this economic evolution that is central problem in this school. The approach to 
these questions is performed in a context where the agents have bounded rationality 
(they cannot see all the possible futures of each decision) and so they adopt ‘rules of 
thumb’ or ‘routines’ to decide. Moreover, the analysis is done not at the individual level 
but at the level of the firm or organizations, or even countries. The emphasis of 
evolutionary economics is on firm capabilities and routines (Vromen, 2012). 
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Table 2: An Overview of Heterodox’s Schools of Thought 
 
Evolutionary 
Economics 
Post Keynesian 
Economics 
Austrian 
Economics 
New Institutional 
Economics 
Central Problems Economic Evolution 
Scarcity of Effective Demand / 
Growth and Dynamics / 
Unemployment 
Investigate the Coordination of 
Agents and their Specialized 
Activities 
Transactions costs, 
property rights, and 
contracts  
Solution 
Development /  
Technological Change 
Manage Aggregate Effective 
Demand 
Decentralization 
Institutions that promote 
market freedom and 
protect property rights 
Level of Analysis Meso Macro Macro Meso 
Agents 
Heterogeneous,  
Bounded Rationality 
Heterogeneous 
Subjective Theory of Value / Trial 
and Error 
Individual rational 
choice with constrains 
Property of 
Markets 
Non Equilibrium,  
Always Evolving 
Non Equilibrium, non-Market 
Clearing 
Always Evolving - 
Archetypical 
Individuals 
Veblen, Schumpeter, 
Nelson & Winter 
Keynes, Kalecki   Menger, Von Mises, Hayek 
Coase, North, 
Williamson 
Idiosyncratic 
Terms 
Innovation, Imitation, Technology, Path 
Dependence, Routines, Rules of Thumb 
Income, Money, Public Policy, 
Uncertainty, Social Relations, 
Institutions, Path Dependence 
Institutions, Decentralization, 
Market System 
Institutions, 
Development, Contracts 
Important Journals 
Journal of evolutionary economics, Industrial 
and Corporate Change, Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics 
Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics 
Quarterly Journal of Austrian 
Economics, Review of Austrian 
Economics 
Journal of Institutional 
Economics,  
Methodologies (or 
Heuristics) 
Novelty-emergence-and-dissemination or  
variation-selection-retention 
Babylonian Methodology Praxeology - 
Ontological 
Considerations 
Critical Realism Critical Realism Marginalism plus Open Reality - 
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There are various explanations to this phenomenon of economic evolution.
22
 The so 
called “old evolutionary economics” (Andersen, 1994: 1) and the “new wave of 
evolutionary theorists” (Hodgson, 1993: 149). The first one follows the work by 
Schumpeter. The latter, refers to the work by Nelson and Winter, which culminated in 
the book An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, published in 1982.  
The “old evolutionary economics” is a non-domain view (not associated ontologically 
with another science) and states that change is caused by endogenous factors inside the 
system, be it a language or a firm in a competitive market. To be considered 
evolutionary, a system must evolve into a state that did not exist previously. In this 
sense, evolution is defined generically, meaning that the evolution is the self-
transformation of the system through time (Witt, 2004, 2008). In an earlier stage of the 
theory, Schumpeter viewed the entrepreneur as an individual with certain characteristics 
that distanced him/herself from the others and was capable of an innovative leap (in this 
analysis the agents are heterogeneous and each have bounded rationality). Later, he 
substituted his entrepreneur by the organizations inside large firms but did not explain 
how these organizations operated. From this perspective, it is the generation and 
dissemination of novelty the portrayer of evolution (Witt, 2008).  
The “new wave of evolutionary theorists”, which imported some terminology from 
evolutionary biology, uses Darwinian concepts to explain change inside a system.
23
 It 
uses an heuristic of variation-retention-selection applied to economic change but the 
ontological issue is left open about the relation with biology and is by now the most 
popular heuristic in the evolutionary approach (Witt, 2004).
24
 This form of explanation 
recurs to metaphors and comparisons with the biological realm to understand economic 
phenomena, especially the selection metaphor. It has some problems because these 
mechanisms do not function in economic reality as they do in the biological one (for 
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 Witt (2008) proposes four distinct subcategories in evolutionary economics. He devises a 2x2 matrix 
with a monistic or dualistic ontology in one hand and a variation-retention-selection or novelty emergence 
and dissemination heuristic on the other hand. A monistic ontology states that economic reality is 
interdependent with biologic reality. A dualistic ontology is the opposed. A variation-retention-selection 
heuristic borrows the process of inferring from evolutionary biology. And novelty emergence and 
dissemination heuristic refers to a generic and endogenous evolution process.  
23
 For a synthesis on evolutionary thinking in social sciences see Nelson (2006). 
24
 Witt (2008) points to Donald Campbell (1965) which reduced the explanation of evolution in biology 
to the terms variation, selection and retention modified to fit the specific nature of other sciences.  
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instance, cognition plays a vital role in the selection process and is not at all 
independent from variation (Witt 2004)).
25
  
Although, the two views seem different there are three common links (Fagerberg 2003): 
the innovation as the engine of long term economic growth; the regularities in the 
innovative process (innovation followed by imitation and the new opportunities created 
by innovations that lead, with accumulated experience, to a certain path dependency); 
and the importance of cognition, with routines being reproduced trough practice are the 
commonalities.  
Policy intervention can be considered problematic in an environment continuously 
evolving. van den Bergh and Kallis synthesize the different policies in evolutionary 
economics literature and remark that “[p]olicy advice from an evolutionary perspective 
emphasises, among others, innovation and learning, diversity management, stimulating 
recombinant innovation, exploiting status seeking behaviour of consumers to stimulate 
escape from lock-in, and protected niches to nurture new technological variants”  (van 
den Bergh and Kallis, 2013: 298). These fields of intervention are in a framework of an 
evolutionary process (evolving and uncertain) and it can be difficult to make a 
normative statement about how the economy should perform. However, one can still 
use a maximum social welfare as an objective of policy. What van den Bergh and Kallis 
defend is that evolutionary policy assume a a priori emphasis on “diversity, 
experimentation, learning and democratic deliberation” (van den Bergh and Kallis, 
2013: 299) and, as such, understanding the right level of diversity at a given time is 
crucial to promote the correct trade-offs necessary on any kind of economic policy 
proposal. 
This school of thought passes the three criteria by (Backhouse, 2000b). It purposely 
distance itself from mainstream economics on its arguments. Additionally, it has 
separate journals such as Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Industrial and Corporate 
Change, and Structural Change and Economic Dynamics (Vromen, 2012). Lastly, the 
innovation and technological competition (with heterogeneous firms’ capabilities) 
constitutes the engine of economic transformation.       
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 This is but one of four ways of importing the Darwinian principles to economics (see Witt, 2004). From 
those, two others are gaining popularity, Universal Darwinism and the ‘continuity hypothesis’. About 
Universal Darwinism one of the principal articles defending it is Hodgson (2002). Some critics to 
Universal Darwinism provided by Cordes (2006, 2007). And for the ‘continuity hypothesis’ see Witt 
(2004). For a side by side comparison of the two sides see Vromen (2012). 
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2.2.2. Post Keynesian Economics 
According to Arestis (1996), the starting point of economic analysis of this school is 
Keynes’s  principle of effective demand.26 It seeks to extend the understanding Keynes’s 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
27
 The central problems studied are 
the scarcity of effective demand, growth and dynamics, and (un)employment.  
The “role of aggregate demand in the context of a monetary production economy” gives 
this school the framework necessary to be mentioned as an independent school of 
thought (Arestis et al., 1999: 527-528). The level of analysis in this school in centered at 
macro level. Post Keynesians reject the ‘methodological individualism’ and defend that 
the individual is conditioned by the surrounding environment and so individual choices 
“have unintended macroeconomic consequences” (Chick, 1995: 26).  
Being an heterodox school and according to Lawson’s (2013) groups, this school 
searches for realistic descriptions of reality (Chick, 1995) and uses critical realism as its 
ontology (see Lawson, 1994).  
There are, as stated from Kerr (2005), three strands in this school, which he refers to as 
the fundamentalist Keynesians, the neoRicardians (or surplus approach) and the 
Kaleckian-Robinsonians.
28
  
The fundamental Keynesians and the Kaleckian-Robinsonians share some core concepts 
such as the role of investment in determining the level of output and employment, 
inserted in a monetary production economy. Each strand, then, gives different emphasis 
to particular dimensions of analysis. Fundamental Keynesians, as in evolutionary 
economics explained earlier, give a particular attention to history in economics but 
consider different phenomena as relevant. Evolutionary economics is concerned with 
how novelty is generated in a system and its repercussions, but fundamental Keynesians 
are worried about the “non-neutrality of money and the absence of gross substitutability 
between money and all other goods” (Kerr, 2005: 477). In this sense, path dependency 
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 The same author explains that this principle states that in a modern economy it is the lack of demand 
and not the lack of resources that constrains the amount of output that the economy produces (although 
the theory does not discard the possibility of scarcity of resources).  
27
 For a further reading on why this can be considered an independent and coherent school of thought see 
Chick (1995). 
28
 In this article, Kerr uses the groups defined by Hamouda and Harcourt (1988). Elsewhere, it is 
mentioned other authors that propose other groupings (Arestis et al., 1999: 544). Arestis (1996) considers 
the institutionalists (in the tradition of Veblen) as the third strand instead of the neoRicardians. More 
recently, Dequech (2012) synthesizes that neoRicardians are a separate group, nevertheless we maintain 
the groups listed above.  
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results on the ‘long run’ being a chain of successive ‘short runs’ (Kerr, 2005). ‘Long 
run’ equilibrium is not addressed because at the end of an investment the world would 
have already changed, rendering the task to calculate it meaningless (Chick, 1995). As a 
further matter, this approach regards uncertainty and financial institutions as pillars of 
research (Dequech, 2012).  
Kaleckian-Robinsonians emphasize that the distribution of income is crucial to growth 
dynamics. The surplus approach is quite different from the previous. It excludes the role 
of money to the determination of prices and views these prices as fluctuating around a 
‘rest state’ in the long run (Kerr, 2005).29 All in all, uncertainty plays a large role, 
institutions matter (money is considered an institution and is generally endogenous and 
affects ‘real’ variables), historical context is necessary to understand reality, social 
relations are important (for instance, contracts usually reduce uncertainty) and 
methodological questions are addressed in an important way (Asensio, 2013; Dequech, 
2012; Lawson, 1994).  
At the policy level, post Keynesianism lies somewhere between a deterministic policy 
control and “nondecisionism” (Heise, 2009).30 Post Keynesians consider that the policy 
maker is not just an agent that corrects “market failures” but is part of the process with 
the aim to make some alteration in a market. Plus, every agent in the market can 
influence aggregate variables (such as GDP, or unemployment rates or inflation).
31
 
Having in mind that this school considers that the economy does not converge to a 
Pareto optimum, usually, the emphasis of policy is on monetary issues.
32
 As was argued 
by Lavoie (2006), there is a consensus that monetary policy is achieved through the 
control of an interest rate (the Taylor rule). With some modifications, Lavoie (2006) 
addresses the post Keynesian side, referring that demand has ‘real’ impacts in the ‘long 
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 Arestis et al. (1999) argue that Sraffians (neoRicardians) and Post Keynesians form a larger group of 
postclassical economics. If we interpret this long run as a guide and a not reachable one, then the two 
views can be grouped. However, Dequech (2012) mentions other articles that do not consider this 
approach as being Post Keynesian. We leave the issue open to debate, and maintain the approach in our 
analysis.     
30
 For example, the author uses the IS-LM model as a case of deterministic policy model. In this 
framework policy proponents use it to make fine-tuning decisions. On “nondecisionism”, it is used the 
case of New Classicals and Hayek. New Classicals state that agents use rational expectations and thus 
policy interventions are anticipated and incorporated in the agents’ decisions. Hayek defended that the 
policy maker should only “provide the framework for self-regulation and self-control” (Heise, 2009: 388). 
These two views, place the emphasis of decision at the individual level and economic policy is, thus, 
unnecessary.  
31
 They are not always price takers as in other views. 
32
 Arestis and Sawyer (2010) are two authors, among others, that consider fiscal policy more “potent” 
than monetary policy. 
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run’ as in the ‘short run’. As a further matter, and relative to R&D, post Keynesians 
emphasize the relevance of an “adequate budgetary policy” that leads to full 
employment. This policy aims at providing short term growth investing in issues not 
attractive to private investors (Bellais, 2004: 438).
33
 In sum, managing effective demand 
through monetary policy seems to be of central importance in this analysis.  
As mentioned in the previous school of thought, post Keynesians pass the criteria of 
Backhouse (2000). They distance themselves from mainstream (some critics of this 
school even suggest that it is the only feature of it). We can find articles related to this 
school in, for example, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, Review of Keynesian Economics, Review of Political Economy and 
European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention. The core 
assumption that deviates from the mainstream theory is that this school considers that 
there are ‘real long run’ impacts of monetary policy.        
2.2.3. Austrian Economics 
The history of this school goes back to Carl Menger and, more recently, to the 
contributions from Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Martin (2009) argues that, 
of all heterodox schools, this is the one closer to mainstream economics. The main 
difference comes from its ontology and slightly from methodology. Against 
mainstream, Austrian Economics emphasizes the critique of mathematical formalism 
and this detachment is one of the primary distinctions that puts this school in the 
heterodox category (Backhouse, 2000a; Martin, 2009). The proponents of this school 
view reality as an open system but at the same time accept methodological 
individualism as their principal heuristic (Lewis, 2010). This creates a unique relative 
position of this school in that it accepts rationality and agents pursue it, at the same time 
that it considers the system open. This is possible because, as in other heterodox 
schools, there is (Knightian) uncertainty.
34
 It is possible for individuals to be rational 
even in a non-perfect information scenario because, as von Mises explains,  
Human action is necessarily always rational….When applied to the ultimate ends of action, 
the terms rational and irrational are meaningless. The ultimate end of action is always the 
satisfaction of some desires of the acting man. Since nobody is in a position to substitute 
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 As referred early, post Keynesians view the ‘long run’ as a succession of ‘short runs’. 
34
 Agents are not only maximizing their utility based only on their scarcities (objective maximization) but, 
because of an uncertain future, they need subjective values. Thus, they are still maximizing their utility 
but as they do not know all the possibilities, only by chance that is the best possible choice. This 
framework permits at the same time that agents maximize their behavior (based on subjective and not 
objective values but maximization nevertheless) and the openness of the system. 
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his own value judgments for those of the acting individual, it is vain to pass judgment on 
other people’s aims and volitions. No man is qualified to declare what would make another 
man happier or less discontented. (von Mises, in Holcombe (2009: 305).  
Austrian economics explains reality based on axiomatic propositions, known as 
praxeology. Instead of starting the analysis at the empirical level, what praxeology 
states is that we start with explanatory axioms we know to be true (Backhouse, 
2000a).
35
 Those axioms are concluded after “a process of self-examination and 
introspection” (Lewis, 2010: 281) and are always true despite any historical context. 
This school of thought “embraces the central tenets of marginalism without abandoning 
a conception of social reality as open” (Martin, 2009: 518). Although a lot of attention 
is dedicated to the individual, the level of analysis of this school is at the aggregate level 
and the questions to answer are related to how this individual behavior translates to 
social order and the mechanisms that operate in such process (Rosen, 1997; Yeager, 
1997). But to see a broader picture from a small scale, coordination problems arise.
36
 
According to Hayek (1945), these coordination problems are resolved through a relative 
price institution. In his view, people take actions decentralized without needing to know 
what really caused them to change, observing only the changes in prices taken, and 
order is achieved spontaneously. 
At the policy level, we would like to refer two areas of policy intervention, one is how 
central banks should act in a recession phase and the second about climate change. On 
central bank policy, Cwik (2008), arguing in a context of Austrian business cycle 
theory
37
, draws five implications; the first is that increasing interest rates without 
increasing input prices does not necessarily cause a recession: the second, explains that 
the selling of fixed capital investment is does not explain the duration of recessions; the 
third defends that real savings are necessary to transition the economy back again to 
expansion; fourth and fifth, expansionist fiscal and monetary policy are not sufficient to 
the said transition. A guide to a government and central bank from these implications is 
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 For instance, “[t]he fundamental axiom is that human beings act – they make choices in order to 
achieve their goals” (Backhouse, 2000a: 32). 
36
 “How can it be that a very large number of agents with some success are able to coordinate their 
actions, when they are all engaged in a division of labor that is steadily increasing, and when each of them 
have only very little knowledge of most other agents?” (Foss, 1996: 77). Moreover, at the individual level 
agents maximize their utility, but since all of them have different subjective values how can society 
coordinate and attain ‘social order’? 
37
 Austrians argue that monetary policy is responsible to “interfere in the normal working of the credit 
market.” On a monetary economy, the pressure applied to bankers to keep interest rates below the natural 
interest rate would only lead to inflation and misallocation of intertemporal resources. (Backhouse, 2002: 
217). 
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to not interfere with the price adjustment process, to not increase the monetary base and 
to intensify the want from agents on savings. 
On climate change, Dawson (2013) defends that externalities caused from pollution are 
not a market failure but result from the misallocation of property rights. An implication 
from this statement results in saying that conventional policy instruments used, such as 
taxes and emissions trading, are wrongly applied. Since it is a question of property 
rights being violated, tort litigation would be sufficient to protect the damage caused on 
individuals. From this viewpoint, there should not be public policy regarding climate 
change.  
2.2.4. New Institutional Economics 
In the early 20
th
 century, Hamilton (1919: 313) stated: “The proper subject-matter of 
economic theory is institutions.” The study of institutions was largely ignored in the 
decades after in favor of more mathematical formulations (see the sub chapters above 
on neoclassical economics and subsequent schools). Later in the century, and distancing 
from this “old institutionalism”, Williamson (1975) coined the term “new institutional 
economics.”38  
In more recent times, Jameson (2006) identifies two strands in this school. The “New 
New Institutional Economics” and the “New Old Institutional Economics.” The first 
group is associated with the work of Douglas North and his contribution to the 
understanding of economic change in conjunction with a comprehensive micro analysis. 
The second group, associated, for example, with Geoffrey Hodgson, focuses on 
continuing the institutionalist tradition, with orientation to policy matters and a critique 
of market fundamentalism. The new view, in general, does not distance too much from 
the accomplishments from mainstream (particularly neoclassical economics) and accept 
methodological individualism (Ménard and Shirley, 2014; Richter, 2005; Searle, 2005). 
The emphasized problems relate mainly to three concepts: transactions costs, property 
rights and contracts (Ménard and Shirley, 2014).
39
 The transaction cost importance can 
be observed in Coase (1998: 73): “the productivity of the economic system depends on 
specialization (he [Adam Smith] says the division of labor), but specialization is only 
possible if there is exchange – and the lower the costs of exchange (transaction costs if 
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 For a broader view on the history of “new institutional economics” see Hodgson and Stoelhorst (2014) 
and references therein. 
39
 Ronald Coase is a central author in this school. For a deeper understanding of his contribution see 
Shirley et al. (2014). 
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you will), the more specialization here will be and the greater the productivity of the 
system. (…) In effect it is the institutions that govern the performance of an economy.” 
But is it really institutions that affect economic growth or the other way around? For 
instance, Acemoglu et al. (2001) defend that the European colonial experience is a 
source for differences in institutions.
40
 Arguing in the other direction, Chang (2011) 
gives counterexamples as to why it is economic growth that affect institutions.
41
 The 
consensus seems to be that better institutions improve economic development 
(Gagliardi, 2008).  
About property rights, Coase (1960) explains that what owners own is not a good but 
the right to use that good (or a factor of production). Exploring this right to use, 
individuals often impose a cost to others. What the author defends is that, since 
transaction costs are positive, attributing property rights in a way that social welfare is 
higher than the sum of private welfare is a better alternative than laissez faire. The 
contracts are central to the analysis too because, opposing the neoclassical assumptions, 
they are not completely enforced neither complete (Ménard and Shirley, 2014). As 
stated by Williamson (1996: 377), a contract is “an agreement between a buyer and a 
supplier in which the terms of exchange are defined by a triple: price, asset specificity, 
and safeguards”.42 These concepts form the nucleus of the new institutional approach. 
Accordingly, the institutional framework is of utmost importance in determining 
economic performance.  
We have yet to define an institution but this definition is not yet established as definite. 
There are a variety of definitions of institution depending on the perspective one wants 
to analyze. Gagliardi (2008: 417) summarizes three distinct definitions of institution. On 
one, institutions can be seen as the rules of the game, i.e., the rules that conduct 
individual’s behavior. In another, institutions are defined as the players of the game. 
The third definition the author considers is appraising institutions as “the self-enforcing 
equilibrium outcome of the game.” This definition is linked with game theory (repeated 
games) and with evolutionary game theory (see subchapter above). Hodgson (2006: 2) 
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 Colonized countries with lower mortality rates of settlers are today richer than the others. The countries 
with higher mortality rates were the ones in which colonizers focused only in extractive industries. The 
ones with lower rates saw the incoming of many of the colonizers’ institutions. This article has the 
assumption that institutions that promote market freedom and protect property rights contribute to a larger 
economic growth. 
41
 In his view it is erroneous to think that promoting free markets and protecting property rights is an 
automatic generator of growth. 
42
 Since they are not completely enforced, neither complete, there is room for opportunism. 
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proposes to consider “institutions as systems of established and prevalent social rules 
that structure social interactions.”  
According to Searle (2005), there are two functions that explain an institution. The first 
is “X counts as Y in C” and the second one is “S has power (S does A)”. In the former, 
X can be an individual or an object with certain characteristics that gained a status 
function Y in a context C. This status Y permits X to fulfill actions that were not 
possible previously. With this status gain, come responsibilities and rights, giving X 
deontic powers.
43
 In the latter, S has an appropriate relation with X (S=X). Let us give 
an example. Some individual X is appointed “CEO” of such company. The position 
“CEO” is the equivalent to “S has power (S does A)”. Since X equals S, the individual 
has gained the power and responsibility (has a deontic power) and is recognized by 
society to act in such manner. The individual X can now act further from before being a 
“CEO” because it was assigned to him/her a certain status. “The whole analysis then 
gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the 
assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, 
institutional facts, and deontic powers” (Searle, 2005: 22).44  
Hindriks and Guala (2014) provide a broader picture of institution compatible with 
Searle’s (2005). Accounting the various meanings of institution, the rule-based, the 
equilibrium-based and the constitutive rules, they argue that these cases can be 
aggregated into a single framework they designate by rules-in-equilibrium account. 
What they add is a third condition besides rules and equilibrium which is 
representation. The representation state is “to capture the idea that the players must be 
able to represent the equilibrium in symbolic form” (Hindriks and Guala, 2014: 8). In 
sum, what these authors propose can be described as: individuals have rules as to act in 
certain circumstances; they have strategies to act based on what the other individual can 
do; there is at least a strategy that is an equilibrium; these equilibrium strategies can be 
explained from “symbolic markers” (representation); and these representation rules 
permit the individuals to achieve some kind of coordination. Now we have a better 
understanding of what is and what does institutions accomplish.  
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 Deontic powers are here referred as “rights, duties, obligations, authorizations, permissions, 
empowerments, requirements, and certifications” (Searle, 2005: 10). 
44
 See the article for the complete explanation. 
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2.3. Final considerations 
We established a frontier to distinguish between mainstream and heterodox economics 
although this frontier is not static through time because there is progress. Since there is 
progress, heterodoxy is not composed by the same theories over time and mainstream 
eventually adopts new theories and renegades others. We cannot, thus, ignore the 
historically context in this dualism. As Coats (2000) points out, there are four areas of 
work in which new results are being developed. First, a new way of defining human 
nature with a special critique to the homo oeconomicus stereotype; second, noticing that 
an economic system is not static and evolves, which causes friction with the concept of 
equilibrium (history matters and some decisions in the present lead to path dependent 
futures); third, economics is now a more interdisciplinary science as it should be; fourth 
and finally, Coats (2000) considers too economic methodology as an heterodox field. 
These topics, many very important in some schools, will possibly become mainstream 
one day. 
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3. Methodological considerations 
3.1. Research question and the methodological choice 
The aim of the present study is to ascertain whether schools of thought that economists 
share have impact on their perceived causes of the current, cyclical and structural state 
of the Portuguese economy, as well as on the policies they recommended to overcome 
such state (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Details on the data gathered though the on line survey 
Questionnaire - 
Part 
Investigative questions 
Variable(s) 
required 
Detail in which data is 
measured 
 
How would you define your 
methodological orientation? 
All schools of 
thought listed in the 
literature review 
All schools of thought 
listed in the literature 
review 
Part I – causes of 
economic 
performance 
It is a cause of poor performance 
of the Portuguese 
economy…(opinion) - Part 1 
Opinion of the 
inquired 
Strongly agree, Mildly 
agree, Neither agree nor 
disagree, Mildly 
disagree, Strongly 
disagree, Do not know / 
do not answer 
Part II 
The causes of the weak 
economic performance of the 
Portuguese economy (opinion) - 
Part 2 
Part III - Policy 
It can be effective to lift the 
Portuguese economy from the 
current phase of 
difficulty…(behavior) - Part 3 
 
Taken this aim into consideration, the most adequate methodology to follow is 
quantitative. In concrete, we gather economists’ opinions/viewpoints through a 
purposed created questionnaire. Similarly to De Benedictis and Di Maio (2011), in this 
dissertation we administer a questionnaire to 1986 academic economists.  
In our specific case, we consider the academic economists included in the ‘Economics 
Research in Portugal: People and Institutions’ database, which considers academics 
economists with at least one paper published in journals indexed in Econlit database.
45
 
In selecting academic economic researchers with articles published we are assuming 
that these individuals have a higher propensity to be chosen to policy positions in future 
governments. Moreover, we assume the academic researchers know how to self-identify 
their school of thought. Alongside the database, we sent the questionnaire to professors 
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 In http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/cef.up+nipe-rank/index.asp. This is a database 
administered by Paulo Guimarães or Miguel Portela, which contains 3278 publications of Portuguese 
Authors and Portuguese institutions in 618 international journals indexed in the EconLit database. 
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in the department of economics in the various public and private Portuguese 
universities. 
Questionnaires are best used for descriptive or explanatory research (Saunders et al., 
2009) and, as such, we consider this is the most adequate method according to our 
research objectives. 
3.2. Description of the survey 
The questionnaire includes three main parts. The first part includes 13 propositions 
about the opinion on what constitutes a sign of economic decline. The second part is 
divided in 5 categories and has a total of 39 propositions which aim to capture the 
causes of the Portuguese crisis. The third part encompasses 17 propositions relative to 
solutions to overcome such crisis. These propositions, which reflect personal opinions, 
permit us to identify and discuss some relevant issues. First, the degree of 
(dis)agreement between advocates in each school - one thing is what the relevant 
literature refers as the policy guides from each school, the other is what researchers 
would de facto implement if the chance was given to him/her. Second, the degree of 
(dis)agreement between proponents from different schools of thought – in concrete to 
assess whether there are different perceptions about the causes of the Portuguese 
economy according to economists’ distinct school of thought positions. 
One problem with this analysis is that some proponents of some schools might not be 
tempted to respond. In the literature review we emphasized the mainstream’s lack of 
attention given to study methodological and ontological considerations. This might lead 
to a higher percentage of responses by heterodox economists, making our somehow 
biased. One alternative would be to choose one known individual with characteristics 
that linked him/her to a certain school of thought and proceed with an interview method. 
This method would not, however, be able to capture the (dis)agreement between 
proponents from the same school, which is a dimension we consider relevant to our 
analysis. 
Recall that the ontological basis of our argument is that schools of thought followed by 
researchers influence their tendency to choose between a different set of policies if they 
were in a position of policy making. If so, the predominant school of thought today, 
mainly in universities of reference, can be a proxy to predict what kind of policies will 
be implemented. And so, our ontological basis is explained by subjectivism. “The 
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subjectivist view is that social phenomena are created from the perceptions and 
consequent actions of social actors” (Saunders et al., 2009: 111). Subjectivism states 
that each individual perceives the same situation differently based on how they view the 
world. No academic researcher is one hundred percent from one school and is able to 
understand and accept some arguments from other schools, so we expect that different 
proponents of the same school have slightly different opinions on the world. 
3.3. Data gathering procedure 
The questionnaire was implemented through an online platform, LimeSurvey. The 
survey period occurred over 1 month (February 2015).  
The first email inviting the target population for responding the questionnaire was sent 
on the 2
nd
 February 2015. To this first call 146 individuals responded.  
We sent 4 additional reminders, one per week - 9 february, 16 February, 21 February 
and 27 February – managing to get further (but decreasing) responses – 150, 79, 36, and 
6, respectively.  
Thus, out of the 1986 individuals inquired we got 417 responses (with 126 individuals 
deciding to opt out). This resulted in a response rate of 21%, which is lower than that of 
Di Maio (2013), who got a reply of 33% (out of a set of 1511 Italian economists). 
However, as we realized over the inquired period, our set of Portuguese academics 
included some non-economists that had written and published articles (alone or in co-
authorship) in economic related journals. Some of these opted out of the survey, but the 
majority simply did not respond. 
It is important to note that, in terms of respondent sample, we were able to select only 
economists or individuals who, albeit not having a degree in economics, were actively 
involved in economic related issues. Therefore, our ‘effective’ rate is higher than 21%. 
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4. Schools of Thought and the perception of Portuguese Academics 
regarding the economy 
4.1. General characterization of the respondents  
The questionnaire was sent to 1986 academics actively researching in economic related 
subjects (the vast majority are economists although some non-economists also 
responded). A total of 417 answers were received (21% response rate).  
In a broader perspective (see Table A1 in Appendix), 65% of the respondents are males 
with an average age of 47 years old. According to their professional occupation, 66% 
are university professors (out of these, 50% are assistant professors and 18% full 
professors), with 30% developing their activities in the public universities of Porto, 
Lisbon and Coimbra), and 19% being affiliated in polytechnic institutes. Only 3% have 
as the primary professional position ‘researcher’.  
Having in consideration the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification, and 
excluding the ‘Other topics’ (e.g., economic anthropology , cultural economics , 
economic sociology), the respondents’ primary areas of research are (see Table A2 in 
Appendix) ‘Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth’ 
(10.3% of the total), ‘Financial Economics’ (10.3%), ‘Macroeconomics and Monetary 
Economics’ (9.6%), and ‘Mathematical and Quantitative Methods’ (7.9%). The 
respondents consider the contents of their research as more empirically than 
theoretically led (24% of the respondents evaluate their research distinctly theoretical). 
Although 86% of the respondents recognize that the academic debate on the 
performance of the Portuguese economy has been (over the last 15 years) rather 
superficial and lacking of a depth discussion, and for 63% failed to raise the awareness 
of the average citizen for weaknesses of the Portuguese economy, they admit having 
followed closely that academic debate. Indeed, 64% admitted to have followed the 
debate often and always whereas only 9% admitted never or rarely keep up with the 
debate. Almost all the respondents (95%) followed the debate through the media and 
65% resorted to specialized scientific publications. Those who contributed more directly 
to the debate, that is published books, chapters, articles and/or participated in 
conferences and other related public events about the performance of the Portuguese 
economy involved approximately one quarter (23% of the sample published something 
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on the issue) to one third (30% participated in public sessions as speakers) of the 
sample.  
Interestingly, only 14.4% of the respondents consider that the debate undertaken on the 
performance of the Portuguese economy produced an impact on the public policies 
implemented. 
Regarding the school of thought, almost a third of the respondents state that they do not 
possess any specific methodological orientation (see Table 4). Those who reported a 
given orientation, 12.5% identify themselves as Neoclassical, 11.8% as Behavioralists 
and 6.7% New Keynesians.  
Although, as referred in Section 2, the boundaries of the so-called ‘mainstream’ and 
‘non mainstream’ streams are not clear cut, we following Di Maio (2013) and consider 
different groupings (see Table 4) – Mainstream extra vs Heterodox; Mainstream large 
vs Heterodox large; and Mainstream vs Non-Mainstream - which permit us latter to 
analyze the main characteristics of each group and assess the intra and inter group 
(dis)agreement regarding namely the policies.  
Table 4: Distribution of Portuguese economists regarding schools of thought 
   School of thought 
Number of 
Respondents 
% 
Mainstream 
extra (30.9%) 
[45.3%] 
Mainstream 
large (19.2%) 
[28.1%] 
Mainstream 
(12.5%) 
[18.2%] 
Neoclassical 52 12.5 
Non-mainstream 
(55.9%) 
[81.8%] 
Keynesian / New Keynesian 28 6.7 
Heterodox large 
(49.3%) 
[71.9%] 
Behavioral 49 11.8 
Heterodox 
(37.4%) 
[54.7%] 
Eclectic 47 11.3 
Austrian / Neo Austrian 2 0.5 
Evolutionary 20 4.8 
Experimental 33 7.9 
Institutionalist / New 
Institutionalist 
27 6.5 
Keynesian / Post Keynesian 12 2.9 
Marxist 6 1.4 
Other  9 2.2 
No school 
(31.7%) 
No school 
(31.7%) 
No school 
(31.7%) 
Without a specific 
methodological orientation 
132 31.7 
   Total 417 100.0 
Note: The question posed was: “How would you define your methodological orientation?”  
Using those groupings, about 31% of the respondents can be included within the 
‘mainstream’ economics, considering the latter in its more comprehensive setting 
(‘Mainstream extra’). Eclectics comprise 11.3% of the total and are the largest category 
within the so called Heterodox economics (which includes beside Eclectics, Austrian / 
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Neo Austrian, Evolutionary, Experimental, Institutionalist / New Institutionalist, 
Keynesian / Post Keynesian, and the Marxist). The rest of the sample is dispersed by the 
remaining schools of thought (see Table 4). 
Characterizing a little further the sample, researchers within the mainstream group are 
mainly involved in ‘Public Economics’ (15.4% of mainstream), ‘Economic 
Development’ (13.5%), ‘Industrial Organization’ 13.5%), ‘Financial Economics’ 
(9.6%), and ‘Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics’ (9.6%). The non-mainstream 
group focuses its investigation (excluding the ‘other topics’ of research) in ‘Economic 
Development’ (11.1% of non-mainstream), ‘Financial Economics’ (9.9%), 
‘Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics’ (9.4%) and ‘Business Administration and 
Business Economics, Marketing, Accounting, Personnel Economics’ (8.2%). 
Mainstream respondents are relatively more inclined than non-mainstream to ‘Public 
Economics’ and ‘Industrial Organization.’ 
4.2. Main distinctive characteristics between mainstream and heterodox academics 
Exploring individual characteristics, in Table 5, we test various dichotomies to 
understand whether the respondents’ individual characteristics (such as their age, sex, 
academic position, research preference, market orientation and if they favor social 
mobility) are in any way linked with schools of thought.  
Considering the main dichotomy we follow expressed in column (1), we conclude that 
non-mainstream respondents are older, have a more theoretical approach to research and 
are less market oriented than their mainstream counterparts. 
As we enlarge the mainstream group, in columns (2) and (3), the differences of age and 
research orientation fade and only the market parameter remains significant. 
Interestingly to analyze is the case of the proponents of no specified school of thought. 
In column (4) we analyze the dichotomy mainstream against no school of thought. The 
results show that mainstream are more empirical and market oriented. In column (5) 
opposing non-mainstream with no school of thought we gather that non-mainstream 
respondents are older. If we combine the information of columns (4) and (5), we 
conclude that, regarding individual characteristics, the proponents of no school of 
thought are very similar to non-mainstream ones, except that they are younger. 
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Table 5: Individual characteristics between different groups of mainstream and heterodos economists: Logistic estimations 
Note: *** (**) [*] - Coefficient is significant at 1% (5%) [10%]. Standard errors in parentheses. Grey cells identify the significant estimates. 
 
Dependent variable 
Non-Mainstream vs. 
Mainstream 
Heterodox Large vs. 
Mainstream Large 
Heterodox vs 
. Mainstream extra 
Mainstream vs.  
No School 
Non-mainstream vs. 
 No School 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age (ln) 1.634* 1.394* 1.050 -0.674 1.174** 
 
(0.914) (0.742) (0.679) (0.902) (0.585) 
Male (dummy 1 if man, 0 if woman) -0.355 -0.465 0.261 0.365 0.067 
 
(0.374) (0.310) (0.273) (0.384) (0.235) 
Academic Position (dummy 1 if  Full 
professor or associate with habilitation 
and equivalent; 0 if otherwise) 
-0.035 0.145 0.257 0.476 0.289 
 
(0.433) (0.402) (0.356) (0.523) (0.342) 
Research (dummy 1 if research is more  
theoretical  oriented, 0 if  research is 
more empirical oriented) 
-1.219*** -0.778** -0.198 1.081** 0.128 
 
(0.362) (0.308) (0.289) (0.377) (0.279) 
Market (dummy 1 if market oriented, 0 
if state oriented) 
-1.598*** -0.969*** -1.105*** 1.127** -0.295 
 
(0.357) (0.282) (0.260) (0.364) (0.299) 
Social Mobility (dummy 1 if  
governments should promote social 
mobility, 0 if otherwise) 
0.475 0.122 0.500 -0.172 0.277 
 
(0.338) (0.281) (0.255) (0.355) (0.225) 
Observations 285 285 285 184 365 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test – p-value 0.023 0.354 0.107 0.515 0.585 
Correct % predicted by the model 82.8% 75.1% 63.5% 73.9% 64.4% 
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4.2. A descriptive account about the perceptions of Portuguese academics 
according to their school of thought 
4.2.1. The situation of the Portuguese economy 
The widespread opinion (with 82% of individuals agreeing) about the performance of 
the Portuguese economy is that it has been declining – see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Both mainstream and non-mainstream economists agree that the economy’s 
performance is in a declining route (77% and 84%, respectively), and for the majority 
this declining phase endures at 10 to 14 years (40% of mainstream respondents and 31% 
of non-mainstream) or more (27% for the mainstream and 25% for the non-
mainstream). The fact that a substantial number of respondent associates the declining 
economic performance to the last 15 year might be partially explained by  the important 
institutional changes in the worldwide and European economy, most notably the 
entrance of China in WTO and the enlargement of the EU, and the first years of Euro, 
which severely limited Portugal’s competitiveness. Answers to the proposition "The results 
of the Portuguese economy in recent years show a decline in their economic performance" 
For a large share of the Portuguese academic economists (over 70% of the total), and to 
a larger extent in the case of non-mainstream economists, the increase in poverty and 
the increase in unemployment are a materialization of the economic decline of a 
country. The low investment level in R&D, the low return on human capital, the 
slowdown in per capita income growth and the increase in income inequalities stand 
also higher as relevant indicators of countries’ economic decline – see Table A2 in the 
Appendix. 
There are, nevertheless, noticeable differences between non-mainstream and 
mainstream economists regarding the signs of economic decline. Indeed, about 72% of 
the non-mainstream economists, against only 42% of the mainstream, consider the 
increase in income inequalities an important indicator of a country’s economic decline. 
Also a higher percentage of non-mainstream economists compared to that of 
mainstream envisage the slowdown in per capita income growth (67% vs 52%), the 
slowdown in total factor productivity growth (61% vs 46%) and the slowdown of labor 
productivity growth (53% vs 39%) as concrete manifestations of economic decline. 
In relation to the degree of concern about the past, present and future of the Portuguese 
economy, the opinions diverge significantly between mainstream and non-mainstream. 
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Mainstream economists have become more optimistic about the future in the last five 
years (the percentage of “very concerned” diminished from 52% five years ago down to 
33% today). For the non-mainstream, in contrast, ‘only’ 29% of them stated to be “very 
concerned” five years ago, against 63% that reveal being today “very concerned”.  
Regarding the future, 66% of the non-mainstream economists, against 51% of the 
mainstream, admit to be very concerned with the prospects of the Portuguese economy 
– see Table A3 and A4 in the Appendix. 
4.2.2. The causes that led to the crisis of the Portuguese economy 
Respondents were asked to give their opinions regarding the causes for the poor 
performance of the Portuguese economy. The possible causes (reflected in 39 
propositions) were presented to the respondents into five main macro categories: 
economy’s structural characteristics, international position of Portugal, firms’ 
characteristics, public sector and labor market. 
Almost 80% of the respondents considered the economy’s ‘structural characteristics’ as 
the first or second most important for explaining Portugal’s economic backwardness 
(see Table A6 in the Appendix). Interestingly, the characteristics/issues related to ‘the 
labor market’, the latter being a central object of the policy intervention with the Troika 
memorandum, were considered highly relevant causes for economic decline by only 
14.4% of the respondents. The ‘international position of Portugal’, ‘firms’ 
characteristics’, and the ‘public sector’ are considered as relevant explanations for the 
Portuguese economy by respectively 40.3%, 33.3% and 32.9% of the respondents. 
Within the economy’s structural characteristics, the vast majority of the respondents 
(83% of total) consider the poor quality of public institutions (including, bureaucracy, 
justice and regulators) as a catalyst of the current crisis. Moreover, the ‘high levels of 
corruption’ and ‘the low level of competition, the existence of barriers to firms to 
operate and rent seeking activities’ are also considered important hindered factors for 
over 60% of the respondents.  
Regarding these same structural characteristics/weaknesses, non-mainstream 
economists consider significantly more than the mainstream ones the insufficient level 
of public investment in education (58% vs 31%), the weak dynamic in ICT investment 
(42% vs 29%) and the insufficient quantity of public infrastructures (17% vs 6%) as 
explanations for the low economic performance of the Portuguese economy.  
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Within the international position of Portugal, the low tendency for the 
internationalization of the Portuguese firms, the lack of attraction regarding foreign 
direct investment, and the European Commission policies undertaken are the primary 
factors agreed upon by around half of the respondents. Nonetheless, there are significant 
differences mostly to what relates to European policy and decisions. Non-mainstream 
economists are much more critical with respect to the policy choices of the European 
Commission (60% vs 33%), the ECB’s monetary policy (56% vs 25%) and the Euro 
currency (40% vs 25%). There are significant differences between non-mainstream and 
mainstream economists relating also with the low tendency for the internationalization 
of the Portuguese firms (66% vs 44%) and the increase in international competition 
through dumping and counterfeiting (33% vs 11%). 
Within the firms’ characteristics, it is affirmed that firms’ relative small size is an 
important cause for the poor performance in the process of internationalization of firms 
(65% of total answers) and a barrier when it comes to borrow from banks (56%). It is 
also agreed that Portuguese businesspersons are more risk-averse (59%). Non-
mainstream respondents emphasize the relative firms’ small size as a cause for the 
Portuguese slowdown because, they argue, their small size generates difficulties in 
accessing credit lines (59% vs 42%) and to adopt new technologies (51% vs 30%). 
Regarding the considerations concerning the public sector, a high percentage of 
respondents consider the policies implemented to the reduction of the public deficit 
(69%), the public debt (67%), the low efficiency level of the public sector (63%), and 
the inefficient management of the public sector’s working force (63%) as important 
causes for Portuguese economic laggardness. Interestingly, mainstream respondents are 
more inclined than non-mainstream respondents to consider public debt (80% vs 64%), 
the public deficit (73% vs 51%) and the inefficiency of public sector (71 vs 59%) as 
causes of the Portuguese economic decline. Non mainstream, on the other hand, view 
the policies implemented from the governments to reduce public debt and deficit as a 
cause (75% vs 42%) and the reduction of public employees (26% vs 8%). 
Regarding the issues of the labor market, 67% of the respondents consider the dynamics 
of population ageing a relevant cause for the decline of the Portuguese economy. The 
scarcity of human capital demand is considered an important cause for 58% of the 
respondents. Significantly differences arise when comparing the perceptions of 
mainstream and non-mainstream respondents. Mainstream economists contemplate 
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more than non-mainstream, the low flexibility of the labor market (54% vs 33%), and 
the increased propensity of unions to invoke a strike (37% vs 24%). Non-mainstream, 
however, emphasize more the scarcity of human capital demand (63% vs 42%), the 
policy of wage moderation since the consensus phase, achieved after the signing of the 
memorandum of understanding
46
 (48% vs 23%), the increase in emigration (46% vs 
25%) and the negative impact on productivity of the reforms in the labor market (32% 
vs 12%). 
 
Table 6: Summary of the opinions on the causes of the current economic crisis 
 
Total Mainstream Non-mainstream 
The quality of infrastructure assets (bureaucracy, justice, 
regulators) 
0.825 0.885 0.811 
The policies undertaken for reduction of public debt 0.693 0.423 0.755 
The demographic dynamic 0.671 0.635 0.687 
The situation of public debt 0.667 0.808 0.639 
The small size of the firms, as it makes it more difficult to 
process internationalization 
0.650 0.673 0.665 
The high levels of corruption 0.638 0.596 0.648 
The low efficiency of the public sector 0.628 0.712 0.588 
The inefficient management of public sector employees 0.626 0.654 0.622 
The level of competition, the existence of other barriers to 
entry and income positions 
0.602 0.712 0.601 
The low propensity for internationalization of Portuguese 
business 
0.590 0.442 0.661 
The low risk entrepreneurs 0.585 0.558 0.588 
The low level of education / professional formation 0.580 0.538 0.554 
The demand scarcity of human capital 0.578 0.423 0.627 
The lack of attractiveness of Portugal for Foreign Direct 
Investment 
0.568 0.519 0.588 
The small size of the firms since it makes it more difficult to 
access the credit 
0.561 0.423 0.592 
The situation of public deficits 0.547 0.731 0.511 
The low level of public investment in education 0.530 0.308 0.584 
The choices of economic policy of The European 
commission 
0.525 0.327 0.601 
The ownership structure of Portuguese firms 0.523 0.519 0.511 
Notes: the values represent the percentage of individuals whose answer was "strongly agree" or "agree". Bold indicates the largest 
value. 
4.2.3. Policy propositions 
Potential policy measures to overcome Portugal’s weak economic performance would 
include, according to the respondents, the Portuguese firms should be more global (87% 
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 See “http://economico.sapo.pt/public/uploads/memorandotroika_04-05-2011.pdf.” Accessed on April 4 
2015. 
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of total), backed up with more private R&D (86%) and research in universities (83%). 
Creating more synergies among firms (e.g., science parks or industrial areas) within the 
country (71%) would enable the increase in the quality of goods and services produced 
(74%) and would, in due time, strengthen the economy’s productive structure (72%). 
The public sector should engage in improving its efficiency (83%) and support the lack 
of R&D of the private sector (72%) - see Table 7. 
There are several differences between mainstream and non-mainstream regarding policy 
proposals. Non-mainstream would like to have a government promoting more the 
increase in R&D performed by universities (88% vs 71%) and by the public sector 
(81% vs 56%). Also concerning the public sector intervention non-mainstream 
respondents are particular more keen (than mainstream) in having a government 
encouraging more actively investment, through strategic guidelines (70% vs 21%) and 
investing, itself, in infrastructure (32% vs 8%).  
Regarding courses of action related with firms, non-mainstream respondents also more 
vigorously recommend a more interventive approach. In particular, non-mainstream 
respondents underline that something should be changed in the economy’s productive 
structure (78% vs 52%), the investment in ICT should be promoted (68% vs 40%), and 
that it should be created a consortium of small and medium-sized enterprises (73% vs 
62%). These differences indicate that mainstream respondents are less prone to think 
that active intervention by the government on private/firms issues might be beneficial. 
Adding to this statement, mainstream respondents would, to a higher extent than non-
mainstream, like to see unions’ powers reduced (39% vs 19%) and government 
proceeding with more privatizations (35% vs 11%).  
Regarding the answers of the respondents that claimed not pursuing a specific school of 
thought (which represent 32% of the total respondents), we observe, similarly to the 
respondents that pursue a given school of thought, that the most agreed propositions are: 
promoting the internationalization of firms (84%), increasing public sector efficiency 
(83%), promoting private research (82%) and public research (78%);  the least agreed 
include: reducing the power of unions (24%), increase investment in physical 
infrastructures (21%) and proceed with more privatizations (13%). 
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Table 7: Policy proposals for improving the performance of the Portuguese economy (differences in means) 
  
All respondents Mainstream Non-mainstream 
No School 
of Thought 
Kruskall 
Walis Test 
- p value 
... to promote the internationalization of firms 0.868 0.846 0.888 0.841 0.396 
... to encourage private research 0.863 0.788 0.906 0.818 0.170 
... to proceed with simplifying/increasing the efficiency of the 
public sector 
0.832 0.846 0.833 0.826 0.812 
... to encourage academic research 0.827 0.712 0.880 0.780 0.002 
... to increase the quality of products 0.741 0.712 0.773 0.697 0.352 
... to modify the productive specialization of the economy 0.724 0.519 0.781 0.705 0.000 
... to encourage public research 0.722 0.558 0.807 0.636 0.000 
... to better connect firms within the territory 0.710 0.615 0.768 0.644 0.230 
... to create a consortium of small and medium firms 0.679 0.615 0.734 0.606 0.088 
... to reduce precariousness in the labor market 0.602 0.404 0.661 0.576 0.001 
... to increase the investment in ICT by firms 0.592 0.404 0.682 0.508 0.000 
... to increase public investment in strategic sectors 0.585 0.212 0.695 0.538 0.000 
... to incentivize the growth of the firms’ dimensions 0.540 0.346 0.575 0.553 0.003 
... to promote a more flexible labor market 0.412 0.519 0.361 0.462 0.340 
... to increase investment in physical infrastructures 0.252 0.077 0.318 0.205 0.000 
... to reduce the power of the unions 0.230 0.385 0.189 0.242 0.002 
... to proceed with further privatizations 0.144 0.346 0.107 0.129 0.000 
Notes: the numbers represent the proportion of individuals whose answer was "strongly agree" or "agree" with the proposal; grey cells indicate statistical significant differences in means; bold figures indicate the largest 
values. 
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Although for some of the most frequently proposed policy measures (e.g., to promote 
the internationalization of firms; to encourage private research; to proceed with 
simplifying/increasing the efficiency of the public sector; and to increase the quality of 
products), no significant differences exist among academics pursuing distinct schools 
(mainstream vs heterodox) or those not pursuing a given school of thought, for the vast 
majority of proposals there are noticeable differences. Specifically, heterodox/non-
mainstream academics, to a lager extend than their mainstream counterparts, tend to 
propose increases of investment in physical infrastructures (p-value=0.000); increase 
public investment in strategic sectors (p-value=0.000), increase the investment in ICT 
by firms (p-value=0.000), modify the productive specialization of the economy (p-
value=0.000), and encourage public research (p-value=0.000). To reduce precariousness 
in the labor market (p-value=0.001), to incentivize the growth of the firms’ dimensions 
(p-value= 0.003) or to create a consortium of small and medium firms (p-value=0.088) 
are also policy measures that heterodox tend to propose to larger extent than their 
mainstream or no school counterparts. 
Mainstream academics are also quite distinctive from the remaining individuals as a 
larger proportion of them see further privatizations and the reduction of the power of the 
unions as important policy measures to overcome performance weaknesses of the 
Portuguese economy. 
Within the mainstream, neoclassical academics emphasize the argument of market 
failures to support policy intervention since some markets cannot reach an efficient 
level by their own. One known market failure is the disincentive to invest in R&D, as 
the researcher cannot fully appropriate the benefits of said research. Our results are 
convergent with this argument. 79% and 71% of neoclassical respondents agree, 
respectively, with encouraging private research and academic research (see Table 8).
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They are, however, indecisive as to the efficiency of public research with 56% of them 
agreeing with more public funding. They also give utmost importance, as the theory 
suggests, to improving the efficiency of public sector (85% agree).
48
 To no surprise, 
since they defend a freer market, they do not agree with more public intervention, either 
by investing in strategic sectors (21%) or in physical infrastructures (8%).  
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 Private research is usually associated with applied research and academic research is usually associated 
with basic research. For a review on the benefits of basic research funding see Salter and Martin (2001). 
48
 When governments intervene the result may not correct the market failure but accentuate it. Therefore, 
the government should be as efficient as possible to minimize the errors it makes. 
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New Keynesians and Behavioral economists, which are also part of the mainstream 
group share close views with their neoclassical counterparts. The top four most agreed 
propositions by the academics of the three schools are the same: the increase in the 
efficiency of public sector, promoting the internationalization of Portuguese firms, and 
encouraging private and academic research. There are, notwithstanding, some 
differences between New Keynesians / Behavioralists and neoclassical respondents. The 
former do not consider, at all, the reduction in the power of unions and the continuation 
of more privatizations as envisaged policies. At hindsight, they appear to defend a more 
proactive public presence than neoclassical respondents. 
Within the heterodox group, as we summarized earlier, evolutionary proponents give 
special consideration to change and economic evolution. They are interested in 
explaining what causes long term secular growth one important factor is R&D as they 
consider it a key factor shaping economic change. Our respondents’ answers reflect 
such endeavors. Private research, academic research and public research are all highly 
valorized by, respectively, 90%, 85% and 85% of the evolutionary respondents. An 
additional source of change can be achieved by active policies targeted at modifying the 
productive structure of the economy which would impact the competiveness of firms 
and their ability to compete in international markets, which are defended by 85% of the 
evolutionary respondents. On the opposite side of compliance are the needs to increase 
physical infrastructures and the reduction in the power of unions (only 15% of the 
respondents from de evolutionary school agree/strongly agree with this) and to proceed 
with more privatizations (10%) since, in their perspective, no economic development 
can be achieved through the persecution of these proposals. 
Also related to heterodox stances, new Institutional economists tend to focus on 
understanding transactions costs, property rights and contracts (Ménard and Shirley, 
2014). This school argues that a more efficient market result can be attained if the 
public sector defines clearly property rights (the Coase theorem). And, indeed, the 
proposition that express this is agreed by 90% of new institutionalist respondents. The 
other most agreed propositions (although not strictly connect to the scope of study of 
this school) include to increase private and academic research and the promotion of 
firms’ internationalization, supported by 93% of institutionalist respondents. In line 
with the evolutionists, they do not confer importance to reducing the power of unions 
(19%), increasing investment in physical infrastructures (15%) or proceeding with more 
privatizations (11%) as solutions/policy measures to improve the economic performance 
of the Portuguese economy. 
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Table 8: Policy proposals for improving the performance of the Portuguese economy by school of thought 
 
Neoclass. Behavioral 
New 
Keynesian 
Evoluti. Experim. 
Post 
Keynesian 
New 
Institut. 
Eclectic 
No School 
of 
Thought 
To proceed with simplifying/increasing the 
efficiency of the public sector 
0.846 0.898 0.964 0.700 0.818 0.833 0.889 0.723 0.826 
To promote the internationalization of firms 0.846 0.939 0.964 0.800 0.879 0.833 0.926 0.872 0.841 
To encourage private research 0.788 0.898 0.929 0.900 0.970 0.917 0.926 0.872 0.818 
To encourage academic research 0.712 0.878 0.893 0.850 0.848 1.000 0.926 0.872 0.780 
To increase the investment in ICT by firms 0.404 0.735 0.857 0.550 0.788 0.583 0.593 0.660 0.508 
To increase the quality of products 0.712 0.755 0.821 0.850 0.758 0.750 0.778 0.766 0.697 
To modify the productive specialization of the 
economy 
0.519 0.796 0.821 0.850 0.788 0.833 0.741 0.745 0.705 
To better connect firms within the territory 0.615 0.837 0.786 0.700 0.818 0.917 0.667 0.723 0.644 
To create a consortium of small and medium firms 0.615 0.837 0.714 0.700 0.727 0.750 0.630 0.702 0.606 
To encourage public research 0.558 0.796 0.714 0.850 0.818 1.000 0.815 0.851 0.636 
To reduce precariousness in the labor market 0.404 0.735 0.643 0.500 0.727 0.750 0.630 0.574 0.576 
To incentivize the growth of the firms’ dimensions 0.346 0.633 0.607 0.500 0.697 0.583 0.556 0.532 0.553 
To increase public investment in strategic sectors 0.212 0.714 0.536 0.750 0.697 1.000 0.593 0.723 0.538 
To promote a more flexible labor market 0.519 0.490 0.321 0.300 0.485 0.167 0.259 0.340 0.462 
To increase investment in physical infrastructures 0.077 0.408 0.321 0.150 0.303 0.583 0.148 0.277 0.205 
To reduce the power of the unions 0.385 0.306 0.107 0.150 0.242 0.083 0.185 0.170 0.242 
To proceed with further privatizations 0.346 0.163 0.107 0.100 0.061 0.083 0.111 0.128 0.129 
Notes: the numbers represent the proportion of individuals whose answer was "strongly agree" or "agree" with the proposal 
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4.3. Between and within differences among mainstream and non-mainstream 
academics regarding the causes of economy decline and policy proposals 
4.3.1. Between differences  
By measuring the correlation between mean opinions on causes and on policy proposals 
by school of thought we are able to perceive the disagreement between schools of 
thought (the results are summarized in Table A8 and Table A9 in the Appendix).  
On a first note, the correlations are stronger on policy proposals than on causes. Such 
statement indicates that respondents disagree less on the policy proposals to overcome 
the Portuguese crisis than on the causes that led to the current state of affairs. Given the 
amount of public discussion (in published articles and in the press) this result is 
somewhat unexpected and very interesting to analyze.  
Considering more closely the causes by schools of thought, it is worth mentioning first, 
that Marxists and Post Keynesians are the schools that disagree more with the others – 
the correlations are close to zero compared with Neoclassical Economics / 
Mainstream.
49
 Within the three mainstream schools, Neoclassical and New Keynesian 
have more synchronized views with each other than with Behavioral Economics – the 
latter, interestingly, has higher correlation coefficients with several non-mainstream 
schools than with mainstream ones. New Keynesians, despite being considered 
mainstream in Section 2, have high correlations with most schools, mainstream or non-
mainstream. 
Taking notice on policy proposals, as referred, the correlations are higher compared to 
causes. Even Marxists and Post Keynesians, which disagreed severely on causes, have 
high correlations with other schools of thought. Policy wise, Neoclassical respondents’ 
answers are quite distanced from most of other schools. They have some similarities 
with Austrian and Institutional economics, which is somewhat predictable.
50
 The 
remainder schools share with each other very high correlation coefficients (most above 
0.85). 
                                                     
49
 The Austrian school of thought has lower values but there are only 2 observations in our sample and the 
results are, mostly, not significant. 
50
 Please refer to the explanations given in section 2 to comprehend some core ideas shared between these 
schools. 
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4.3.2. Within differences 
To understand the within differences about the respondents’ perceptions regarding the 
causes and the proposals we resort to analyze the level of entropy associated with the 
answers provided.  
We use Shanon and Weiner diversity index or entropy index to capture the differences 
in the respondents’ perceptions. This index is ranges between 0 and 1. The lower value 
indicates that the answers were fully concentrated in one of the options given; a higher 
value indicates that the answers were equidistributed along our 5 point likert scale. 
Following this, closer to 0 means more agreement between respondents, closer to 1 
more disagreement. 
In Table 9, we observe the level of disagreement within the groups we defined earlier. 
Two results emerge: 1) whichever categorization we consider, non-mainstream / 
heterodox respondents are in more agreement with each other than their mainstream 
counterparts; 2) disagreement within groups is always lower on policy proposals than 
on causes. 
Disaggregating the values in Table 9, we now consider the within differences in 
particular questions for mainstream and non-mainstream respondents. In Table 10, we 
order the five most and least debated (with higher degree of within differences, i.e., 
higher entropy) causes for mainstream proponents and we compare them to the answers 
from non-mainstream respondents. In Table 11 we do the same with the non-
mainstream perspective in mind.
51
 
 
Table 9: Disagreement within groups - average entropy indexes 
 
Number of 
respondents 
Causes for the economic 
decline 
Policy 
Proposals 
Mainstream 52 0.86 0.84 
Mainstream Large 80 0.87 0.81 
Mainstream Extra 129 0.86 0.79 
Non-Mainstream 233 0.84 0.73 
Heterodox Large 205 0.83 0.73 
Heterodox 156 0.83 0.72 
Note: the values are weighted averages of the relative entropy indexes. The weight is calculated according to the 
relative size that each school represents in the group. 
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 See Table A8 and Table A9 in the appendix for the complete ranked list – recall that in total there are 
39 propositions about the causes and 17 about policy proposals. 
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In Table 10 we can distinguish two causes which demonstrate a distinctively view on 
the phenomena. Mainstream economists are substantially divided as to how they 
perceive the policies undertaken for the reduction of public debt and the European 
Commission policy choices. Interestingly to note is that non-mainstream respondents, 
besides showing less disagreement, also are more assertive to consider, than mainstream 
respondents, these two as causes for the Portuguese economic decline.  
Table 10: Disagreement about the causes (mainstream’s view) 
 Mainstream Non-mainstream 
Causes Entropy Rank 
Agree 
% 
Entropy Rank 
Agree 
% 
The policies undertaken for reduction of public 
debt 
0.985 1 42.3 0.743 38 75.5 
The choices of economic policy of The European 
Commission 
0.969 2 32.7 0.839 21 60.1 
The increase in emigration 0.965 3 25.0 0.896 6 45.5 
The low level of public investment in education 0.954 4 30.8 0.897 5 58.4 
The monetary policy of ECB 0.945 5 25.0 0.881 9 55.8 
       
The small size of the firms, as it makes it more 
difficult to process internationalization 
0.762 35 67.3 0.813 30 66.5 
The situation of public debt 0.750 36 80.8 0.832 23 63.9 
The lack of attractiveness of Portugal for Foreign 
Direct Investment 
0.746 37 51.9 0.843 19 58.8 
The low efficiency of the public sector 0.730 38 71.2 0.829 24 58.8 
The quality of infrastructure assets (bureaucracy, 
justice, regulators) 
0.610 39 88.5 0.671 39 81.1 
Note: The questionnaire included 39 propositions about the causes of the Portuguese economy’s decline. 
About the five most agreed causes (lower entropy) for mainstream academics, they look 
similar to non-mainstream in terms of ranking. Nevertheless, a closer look indicates that 
the levels of entropy are smaller in mainstream economists (compared to that of non-
mainstream) indicating, at least, a more coherent group view on these phenomena.  
In Table 11, unlike in the previous paragraph, it is compelling to note that if we order 
the entropy index on the causes for the Portuguese economic decline from the non-
mainstream view, non-mainstream and mainstream groups present a much  similar 
entropy rank (excluding the already mentioned proposition related with the policies 
undertaken to the reduction of the public debt). This indicates that for those five causes 
the answers are considerably distributed along the possible answers. 
Table 11: Disagreement about the causes (non-mainstream view) 
 Mainstream  Non-mainstream  
Causes Entropy Rank 
Agree 
% 
Entropy Rank 
Agree 
% 
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The introduction of Euro 0.941 9 25.0 0.940 1 40.8 
The low flexibility in the labor market 0.885 18 53.8 0.915 2 32.6 
The behavior of unions 0.927 13 36.5 0.911 3 23.6 
The range and quality of products exported by 
Portuguese companies 
0.945 6 30.8 0.903 4 38.6 
The low level of education / professional 
formation 
0.954 4 53.8 0.897 5 55.4 
       
The demographic dynamic 0.845 23 63.5 0.788 35 68.7 
The low propensity for internationalization of 
Portuguese business 
0.840 25 44.2 0.784 36 66.1 
The evolution of input prices 0.776 34 13.5 0.774 37 21.0 
The policies undertaken for reduction of public 
debt 
0.985 1 42.3 0.743 38 75.5 
The quality of infrastructure assets 
(bureaucracy, justice, regulators) 
0.610 39 88.5 0.671 39 81.1 
 
Below, in Table 12 and  
Table 13, we replicate the analysis above, in this case for the policies proposed. 
Focusing on Table 12, in spite of the fact that the ordering appears to be identical, the 
level of entropy is lower, overall, for non-mainstream than for mainstream respondents. 
The differences in this analysis are in line with section 4.2.3. related to the intervention 
of the government in the economy.  
 
 
Table 12: Disagreement about the policy proposals (mainstream view) 
 Maintream  Non-mainstream  
Policy Proposals Entropy Rank 
Agree  
% 
Entropy Rank 
Agree 
% 
To proceed with further privatizations 0.974 1 34.6 0.797 6 10.7 
To reduce precariousness in the labor market 0.974 2 40.4 0.812 5 66.1 
To reduce the power of the unions 0.964 3 38.5 0.891 3 18.9 
To increase public investment in strategic 
sectors 
0.914 4 21.2 0.785 7 69.5 
To promote a more flexible labor market 0.875 5 51.9 0.909 1 36.1 
       
To increase investment in physical 
infrastructures 
0.789 13 7.7 0.901 2 31.8 
To encourage academic research 0.783 14 71.2 0.570 16 88.0 
To encourage private research 0.699 15 78.8 0.547 17 90.6 
To proceed with simplifying/increasing the 
efficiency of the public sector 
0.671 16 84.6 0.646 14 83.3 
To promote the internationalization of firms 0.671 17 84.6 0.586 15 88.8 
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Table 13: Disagreement about the policy proposals (non-mainstream view) 
 Mainstream  Non-mainstream  
Policy Proposals Entropy Rank 
Agree  
% 
Entropy Rank 
Agree  
% 
To promote a more flexible labor market 0.875 5 51.9 0.909 1 36.1 
To increase investment in physical 
infrastructures 
0.789 13 7.7 0.901 2 31.8 
To reduce the power of the unions 0.964 3 38.5 0.891 3 18.9 
To incentivize the growth of the firms’ 
dimensions 
0.854 8 34.6 0.847 4 57.5 
To reduce precariousness in the labor market 0.974 2 40.4 0.812 5 66.1 
       
To better connect firms within the territory 0.873 6 61.5 0.672 13 76.8 
To proceed with simplifying/increasing the 
efficiency of the public sector 
0.671 16 84.6 0.646 14 83.3 
To promote the internationalization of firms 0.671 17 84.6 0.586 15 88.8 
To encourage academic research 0.783 14 71.2 0.570 16 88.0 
To encourage private research 0.699 15 78.8 0.547 17 90.6 
 
We observe, in Table 14, that to every single school, the disagreement is higher 
regarding the causes that led to the present economic situation than on the policy 
proposals. From the proponents with a specified school of thought New Keynesians are 
the ones which disagree more and Marxists which disagree less, relative to causes. On 
policy proposals, Neoclassical respondents dispute more with each other and Marxists, 
again, express their opinions much more similarly. 
 
Table 14: Within disagreement by school of thought 
 
Number of 
respondents 
Causes for the 
economic decline 
Policy 
Proposals 
No School 132 0.89 0.83 
Neoclassical 52 0.86 0.84 
Keynesian / New Keynesian 28 0.88 0.76 
Behavioral 49 0.85 0.75 
Eclectic 47 0.86 0.76 
Evolutionary 20 0.81 0.74 
Keynesian / Post Keynesian 12 0.74 0.64 
Institutional / New Institutional 27 0.88 0.76 
Marxist 6 0.67 0.61 
Experimental 33 0.85 0.72 
Others 9 0.76 0.62 
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5. Conclusion 
Along the quest to comprehend the differences between and within mainstream and 
heterodox economists we detailed the theory underlying the existence of each school. 
Some schools favor mathematical modeling to capture the idiosyncrasy of reality, others 
entail more ad hoc approaches.  
Our main goal was to figure out whether such differences in the theoretical approaches 
of the schools of thought led to de facto differences when economists had identify the 
cause of (declining) economic performance and to defend/propose policies regarding a 
real economic crisis. 
Albeit some results are sensitive to the way we classify the groups between mainstream 
and non-mainstream, for the sake of the present study’s conclusions we opted to 
consider neoclassical economics as the primary school of mainstream economics. 
Using a sample of (417) Portuguese academic economists we obtained the following 
main results. 
First, considering individual characteristics, mainstream and heterodox economists 
differ. On average, mainstream economists are younger, have a more theoretical 
approach to academic research and are more market oriented than heterodox 
economists.  
Second, respondents disagree more on the causes that led to the present Portuguese 
economic crisis than on the policy proposals to overcome such decline. Such result is 
not in line with that from Di Maio’s (2013) study focused on Italian economists which 
concluded the opposite. Portuguese economists consider the low quality of public 
institutions (such as bureaucracy, regulators and justice), the implemented policies 
undertaken to reduce public deficit and the demographic dynamic as the most important 
contributors to the present state of the Portuguese economy. They, however regard as 
utterly irrelevant the quality and quantity of the physical infrastructures, the evolution 
on input prices in global markets and even the reduction in public employees. Policy 
wise, there is a strong agreement related to the internationalization of Portuguese firms, 
the improvement of the public sector and the increase of academic and private R&D. 
They consider proceeding with more privatizations, reducing the power of unions and 
invest in more infrastructures as policies not worth pursuing. 
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Third, and finally, looking to the within differences, whichever mainstream or 
heterodox dichotomy we consider, heterodox respondents appear more coherent (with 
more similar answers) than the mainstream groups. This contradicts some research 
which points to heterodox economics as a more fractioned group. To mainstream 
economists, the policies undertaken to minimize the public deficit and the economic 
policies of the European Commission are the ones which originate more disagreement. 
To non-mainstream economists, the introduction of Euro and the low flexibility of the 
labor market originate more clutter. 
Some limitations that also constitute interesting and challenging avenues for further and 
future research comprise two points.  
First, one could test whether the respondents defend what the theory suggests they 
should defend. A possible method for undertaking such assessment would be to design a 
questionnaire with policy proposals clearly focused on the theory behind each school of 
thought. Such an analysis would permit to understand whether economists know how to 
self-identify their school of thought and / or whether they really defend what the theory 
suggests they should.  
Second, given that the results of policy proposals between mainstream and heterodox 
were so similar when the theory predicts it should not have been that way, it would be 
interesting to analyze whether the differences lye on the implementation of the policies.  
A better designed questionnaire, able to capture the above mentioned two points would, 
for sure, increase the knowledge on the relationship between schools of thought and 
policy action. 
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Appendix 
Email inviting academics to respond the questionnaire 
 
Assunto: Inquérito às ‘Opiniões dos Economistas sobre a Economia’ 
Cara/o colega, 
Em 2007 Luca De Benedictis (Universidade de Macerata) e Michele Di Maio (Universidade de 
Naples "Parthenope"), no âmbito de um projecto sobre o tema "A economia italiana entre o 
declínio nacional e competitividade Internacional", implementaram um inquérito aos 
economistas académicos italianos questionando-os sobre as suas orientações e opiniões no 
debate sobre o declínio económico. 
Em colaboração e com a autorização destes colegas, decidimos adaptar e implementar o 
inquérito original à realidade portuguesa.  
O objetivo da presente investigação é puramente científico. Pretende-se descrever os pontos de 
vista dos economistas académicos portugueses (e/ou colegas, não-economistas, que publicaram 
artigos de conteúdo económico em revistas indexadas na Econlit) em relação ao desempenho da 
economia portuguesa, as suas percepções sobre as causas/explicações para tal desempenho, 
assim como as propostas de intervenção que considerariam mais eficazes. 
A recolha dos dados é feita via web, de forma anónima, sendo que a análise dos dados será feita 
em agregado. O preenchimento do questionário leva cerca de 20 minutos. 
Pode aceder ao questionário on-line em link. 
O inquérito estará disponível para preenchimento até 28 de fevereiro de 2015. 
A sua colaboração é extremamente importante já que a baixa taxa de resposta ao inquérito 
coloca em causa a possibilidade de sucesso do projeto. 
A síntese dos resultados agregados do projecto será disponibilizada, a partir de abril de 2015, no 
site http://www.fep.up.pt/docentes/ateixeira/  
Agradecendo desde já a sua atenção e generosidade, subscrevemo-nos com elevada 
consideração 
José Mendes de Sousa   
Aurora A.C. Teixeira 
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Questionnaire 
 
Opiniões dos Economistas sobre a Economia 
 
A finalidade da presente investigação é estritamente científica. A investigação tem como objectivo 
descrever os pontos de vista dos economistas académicos portugueses e/ou colegas não-economistas 
que publicaram artigos de conteúdo económico em revistas indexadas na Econlit em relação ao 
desempenho da economia portuguesa, as suas percepções sobre as causas/explicações para tal 
desempenho, assim como as propostas de intervenção que considerariam mais eficazes. 
A análise dos dados será feita em agregado, estando garantida a confidencialidade dos mesmos.  
O preenchimento do questionário leva cerca de 20 minutos. 
Investigadores do projecto: José Mendes de Sousa e Aurora A.C. Teixeira (Faculdade de Economia, 
Universidade do Porto) 
 
Parte A: Investigação científica 
 
A1. Indique, por favor, a sua área de investigação principal e secundária (de acordo com a classificação 
do Journal of Economic Literature): 
 Principal Secundário 
História do pensamento económico, metodologia e abordagens 
heterodoxas 
  
Métodos matemáticos e quantitativos   
Microeconomia   
Macroeconomia e economia monetária   
Economia internacional   
Economia financeira   
Economia pública   
Economia do trabalho e demografia económica   
Direito e economia   
Organização industrial   
Administração de empresas e economia da empresa; Marketing; 
Contabilidade 
  
História da economia   
Desenvolvimento económico, evolução tecnológica e crescimento   
Sistemas económicos   
Economia agrícola e dos recursos naturais; Economia do meio 
ambiente e da ecologia 
  
Economia urbana, rural e regional   
Outros tópicos    
 
 
A2. Numa escala de 1 (Empírica) a 5 (Teórica), indique, por favor, a sua principal abordagem de 
investigação: 
1 - Empírica 2 3 4 5 - Teórica 
     
 
A3. Como definiria a sua orientação metodológica? 
 Eclética 
 Institucionalista / Novo Institucionalista 
 Keynesiano / Pós Keynesiano 
 Keynesiano / Novo Keynesiano 
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 Marxista 
 Neoclássica 
 Austríaca / Neo-austríaca 
 Evolucionista 
 Comportamental 
 Experimental 
 Sem orientação metodológica especifica 
 Outra (por favor especifique):  
 
 
Parte B: Situação da economia 
 
Indique, por favor, a sua opinião relativamente às seguintes afirmações (1 - Total desacordo… 5- Total 
acordo; NS – não sei responder) 
 
B1. É uma manifestação de declínio económico... 
(1 - Total desacordo… 5- Total acordo; NS – não sei responder) 
 1 2 3 4 5 NS 
… a desaceleração do crescimento da produtividade do trabalho.       
… a desaceleração do crescimento da produtividade total de factores.       
… a perda de quota das exportações no mercado mundial.       
… o aumento do desemprego.       
… o aumento da dívida pública.       
… a desaceleração do crescimento do rendimento per capita.       
… o aumento da pobreza.       
… o aumento das desigualdades de rendimento.       
… o baixo retorno do capital humano.       
… o baixo nível de investimento em I&D.       
… o ‘atraso’ económico relativamente a outros países europeus.       
… o ‘atraso’ económico relativamente aos Estados Unidos.       
… o baixo nível de crescimento económico comparado com os novos 
países industrializados. 
      
 
B2. Os resultados da economia Portuguesa em anos recentes mostram um declínio no seu desempenho 
económico. 
1 – Discordo totalmente 
2- Discordo em parte 
3- Não discordo nem concordo 
4- Concordo 
5- Concordo totalmente 
NS – não sei responder. 
 
B3. Na sua perspectiva, há quanto tempo a fase descendente da economia Portuguesa perdura?  
Menos de 1 ano 
1-4 anos 
5-9 anos 
10-14 anos 
15-19 anos 
20-29 anos 
30-39 anos 
40 ou mais anos  
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B4. Indique o se grau de preocupação relativamente à situação económica Portuguesa… 
(1 – Nada preocupado… 5- Muito preocupado; NS – não sei responder) 
 1 2 3 4 5 NS 
… há 5 anos atrás       
…há 1 ano atrás       
… na actualidade       
 
 
B5. Relativamente ao futuro da economia Portuguesa a sua posição é  
1 – Pessimista. 
2- Algo pessimista. 
3- Nem pessimista nem otimista. 
4- Algo otimista. 
5- Otimista. 
 
Parte C: Causas do fraco desempenho económico de Portugal 
Indique, por favor, para cada um dos itens listados em baixo, se, em sua opinião, tal é causa do fraco 
desempenho da economia Portuguesa (1 - Total desacordo… 5- Total acordo; NS – não sei responder).  
 
C1. Categoria Macro I: Posição internacional de Portugal e desenvolvimento dos mercados globais 
(1 - Total desacordo… 5- Total acordo; NS – não sei responder) 
 1 2 3 4 5 NS 
A especialização internacional de Portugal.       
A cada vez maior concorrência internacional nos mercados de 
bens e serviços. 
      
O aumento da concorrência internacional através do uso do 
dumping e contrafacção. 
      
A variedade e qualidade dos produtos exportados por empresas 
Portuguesas. 
      
A falta de atratividade de Portugal para Investimento Direto 
Estrangeiro. 
      
A baixa tendência para a internacionalização das empresas 
Portuguesas. 
      
A introdução do Euro (moeda).       
As escolhas de política económica da Comissão Europeia.       
A política monetária do BCE.       
A evolução dos preços das matérias-primas.       
A situação política desfavorável Portuguesa.       
 
C2. Categoria Macro II: Características das empresas 
(1 - Total desacordo… 5- Total acordo; NS – não sei responder) 
 1 2 3 4 5 NS 
A relativa pequena dimensão das empresas torna difícil o 
acesso ao crédito. 
      
A relativa pequena dimensão das empresas torna difícil o 
processo de internacionalização. 
      
A relativa pequena dimensão das empresas torna difícil adoptar 
o uso de noas tecnologias. 
      
A estrutura de propriedade das empresas Portuguesas.       
O papel da família na empresa.       
A baixa propensão dos empresários para o risco.       
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C3. Categoria Macro III: Caraterísticas estruturais da economia. 
(1 - Total desacordo… 5- Total acordo; NS – não sei responder) 
 1 2 3 4 5 NS 
A fraca dinâmica de investimento em tecnologias de 
informação e comunicação. 
      
O insuficiente investimento público em educação.       
A fraca qualidade da educação/formação dos portugueses.        
A insuficiente quantidade de infra-estruturas físicas.       
A fraca qualidade das infra-estruturas físicas.       
A fraca qualidade das instituições públicas (burocracia, justiça, 
reguladores). 
      
O baixo nível de concorrência, existência de barreiras à entrada 
e/ou existência de atividades “rent seeking” 
      
A elevada corrupção.       
 
C4. Categoria Macro IV: Mercado de trabalho 
(1 - Total desacordo… 5- Total acordo; NS – não sei responder) 
 1 2 3 4 5 NS 
Os efeitos negativos (em termos de produtividade) resultantes 
das reformas ao mercado de trabalho. 
      
A baixa flexibilidade no mercado de trabalho.       
A política de moderação/corte salarial seguida a partir da fase 
de consenso política. 
      
A dinâmica demográfica (envelhecimento da população).       
A escassa procura de capital humano.       
A escassa oferta de capital humano.       
O aumento da emigração.       
O comportamento dos sindicatos (de maior propensão às 
greves). 
      
 
C5. Categoria Macro V: Sector público 
(1 - Total desacordo… 5- Total acordo; NS – não sei responder) 
 1 2 3 4 5 NS 
O défice público.       
A dívida pública.       
As políticas implementadas para a redução do défice público.       
A baixa eficiência do sector público.       
A ineficiente gestão dos empregados do sector público.       
A redução do número de funcionários públicos.       
 
C6. Relativamente às causas para ao declínio (fraco desempenho económico) de Portugal, por favor 
ordene do mais relevante (1) para o menos (5) relevante os seguintes conjuntos de causas (tal como 
descrito em anteriormente)  
(1- Mais relevante… 5 – Menos relevante) 
Posição internacional de Portugal e desenvolvimento dos mercados globais.  
Caraterísticas das empresas.  
Caraterísticas estruturais da economia.  
Mercado de trabalho.  
Sector público.  
 
 
 66 
Parte D: Potenciais medidas para ultrapassar/resolver/melhorar o fraco desempenho económico de 
Portugal 
 
Indique, por favor, para cada um dos itens listados em baixo, se, em sua opinião, tal é causa do fraco 
desempenho da economia Portuguesa (1 - Total desacordo… 5- Total acordo; NS – não sei responder).  
 
 
D1. Para melhorar o estado da economia Portuguesa as autoridades de política/Governo deveriam .... 
(1 - Total desacordo… 5- Total acordo; NS – não sei responder) 
 1 2 3 4 5 NS 
… proceder a mais privatizações.       
…melhorar a eficiência do sector público.       
… modificar a estrutura produtiva da economia.       
… aumentar a qualidade dos bens e serviços produzidos.       
… promover a internacionalização das empresas.       
… promover o aumento da dimensão das empresas.       
… criar consórcios de PME.       
… criar melhores condições para ligar as empresas dentro 
do território nacional. 
      
…. aumentar o investimento público em sectores 
estratégicos. 
      
… promover o aumento do investimento das empresas em 
Tecnologias de Informação e Comunicação. 
      
… encorajar o aumento da investigação pública.       
…. encorajar o aumento da investigação privada.       
…. encorajar o aumento da investigação nas 
universidades. 
      
… aumentar o investimento em infra-estruturas.       
… promover um mercado de trabalho mais flexível.       
… reduzir a precariedade no mercado de trabalho.       
… reduzir o poder dos sindicatos.       
 
D2. Adicionalmente às propostas anteriores, por favor sugira outras (máximo de 3) que entenda 
relevantes 
Proposta 1: 
Proposta 2: 
Proposta 3: 
 
 
Parte E: Avaliação do debate sobre o declínio da economia Portuguesa 
 
E1. Por favor indique qual a frequência com que tem seguido o debate académico sobre o declínio da 
economia Portuguesa 
Nunca  
Raramente 
Às vezes  
Frequentemente 
Sempre 
 
 
 
 
 67 
E2. Relativamente ao debate sobre o declínio da economia Portuguesa. 
 Não Sim 
Publicou algum artigo ou livro sobre o assunto?   
Participou em sessões públicas como orador?   
Seguiu o debate mas não participou nele activamente?   
Seguiu o debate através de publicações científicas?   
Seguiu o debate através da imprensa?   
 
E3. Tendo por referência os últimos 15 anos, como avalia o debate académico sobre o estado da economia 
Portuguesa? 
Inexistente 
Superficial 
Um pouco superficial 
Um pouco aprofundado 
Aprofundado 
Não sabe / não responde 
 
E4. Por favor indique o seu grau de concordância face às seguintes afirmações 
(1 - Total desacordo… 5- Total acordo; NS – não sei responder) 
 1 2 3 4 5 NS 
O debate académico sobre o estado da economia 
Portuguesa aumentou a consciência dos cidadãos 
portugueses sobre as fragilidades da economia. 
      
O debate académico sobre o estado da economia 
Portuguesa teve impacto sobre as políticas 
implementadas. 
      
 
Parte F: Outras dimensões 
F1. Por favor, coloque a opção em baixo que na sua opinião constitui a forma/ combinação mais eficaz na 
organização da actividade económica 
 1 – Só Estado 2 3 4 5 – Só 
Mercado 
      
 
 
F2. Segundo a sua perspetiva, os Governos devem encetar medidas de política para promover a 
mobilidade social (i.e., transição de indivíduos ou grupos de um estrato ou de uma classe social para 
outra)? 
1 – Não 
2- Talvez, em determinadas circunstâncias. 
3 – Sim 
4- Não sei responder 
 
 
F3. Idade (anos)  
 
 
F4. Género:  
Feminino 
Masculino 
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F5. Afiliação profissional principal  
Banco de Portugal 
Instituto Politécnico de Beja 
Instituto Politécnico de Bragança 
Instituto Politécnico de Coimbra 
Instituto Politécnico de Leiria 
Instituto Politécnico de Setúbal 
Instituto Politécnico do Porto 
Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa 
Universidade Aberta 
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa 
Universidade Católica Portuguesa 
Universidade da Beira Interior 
Universidade da Madeira 
Universidade de Aveiro 
Universidade de Coimbra 
Universidade de Évora 
Universidade de Lisboa 
Universidade de Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro 
Universidade do Algarve 
Universidade do Minho 
Universidade do Porto 
Universidade dos Açores 
Universidade Lusíada 
Universidade Lusófona de Humanidades e Tecnologias 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
Universidade Portucalense Infante D. Henrique 
Outra (por favor especifique):  
 
 
E6. Categoria profissional (escolher apenas 1 opção) 
Ensino Universitário 
 Professor Catedrático 
 Professor Associado c/ agregação 
 Professor Associado e Auxiliar c/ agregação 
 Professor Auxiliar 
 Assistente e Leitor 
 Assistente Estagiário 
 
 
Ensino superior Politécnico 
 Professor Coordenador Principal 
 Professor Coordenador c/ agregação 
 Professor Coordenador s/ agregação 
 Professor Adjunto 
 Assistente do 2º Triénio (Mestres ou Doutores) 
 Assistente do 2º Triénio 
 Assistente do 1º Triénio 
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Carreira de Investigação 
 Investigador Coordenador 
 Investigador Principal c/ habilitação ou agregação 
 Investigador Principal e Auxiliar c/ habilitação ou agregação 
 Investigador Auxiliar 
 Assistente de Investigação 
 Estagiário de investigação 
 
Outra (por favor especifique): 
 
 
Obrigada pela sua colaboração. A sua resposta é muito importante para nós. 
Caso tenha alguma questão, por favor, contactar Aurora Teixeira (ateixeira@fep.up.pt)  
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Table A 1: Respondents’ age, gender and affiliation 
  
Total 
No School of 
Thought Mainstream Non-mainstream 
Age (average in years) 47 45 45 48 
Gender (% of Males) 65.2 61.4 73.1 65.7 
Professional Affiliation (in % of total) 
    
 Bank of Portugal 
14 6 2 6 
 
University of Lisbon 46 12 2 32 
 
University of Porto 45 11 12 22 
 
University of Coimbra 34 8 3 23 
 
ISCTE 20 7 2 11 
 
University of Minho 18 7 1 10 
 
University of Aveiro 17 8 2 7 
 
University of Évora 14 6 2 6 
 
University NOVA of Lisbon 11 2 4 5 
 
University of Algarve 10 3 0 7 
 
Other public universities 47 19 7 21 
 
Catholic University of Portugal 23 3 4 16 
 
Other private universities 10 3 1 6 
 
Other national organizations 6 1 1 4 
 
Foreign Universities 20 7 4 9 
 
Other foregign organizations 6 4 2 
 
 
Polytecnhical Institute of Lisboa 17 10 
 
7 
 
Polytecnhical Institute of Leiria 16 5 1 10 
 
Other polythechnic institutes 38 8 2 28 
 
Other private professions 5 2 0 3 
 
Total 417 
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Table A 2: It is a manifestation of economic decline... 
 
Total 
No School of 
Thought Mainstream 
Non-
mainstream 
p 
value 
... the slowdown in growth labor productivity 0,520 0,561 0,385 0,528 0,062 
... the slowdown in growth of total productivity of factors 0,585 0,591 0,462 0,609 0,051 
... the loss of share in the world export market  0,523 0,561 0,404 0,528 0,106 
... the growth in unemployment 0,743 0,765 0,577 0,768 0,005 
... the increase of the public debt 0,403 0,379 0,365 0,425 0,432 
... the slowing of the rate of growth of per capita income 0,669 0,727 0,519 0,670 0,041 
... the increase in poverty 0,815 0,795 0,692 0,854 0,006 
... the increase of income inequality 0,659 0,644 0,423 0,721 0,000 
... the low return on human capital 0,645 0,583 0,654 0,678 0,736 
... the low level of investment in R&D 0,691 0,576 0,712 0,751 0,556 
... the economic backwardness compared to European partners 0,520 0,530 0,462 0,528 0,387 
... the economic backwardness compared to United States of America 0,365 0,326 0,327 0,395 0,363 
... the subdued economic growth compared to new industrialized countries 0,463 0,508 0,346 0,464 0,124 
Note: the numbers represent the percentage of individuals whose answer was "strongly agree" or "agree." Grey cells indicate statistically significant differences in means  
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Table A 3: Answers to the proposition "The results of the Portuguese economy in recent years show 
a decline in their economic performance" 
 Totally Disagree Partly Disagree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree Agree 
Totally 
Agree 
Do Not 
Answer 
Frequency 4 52 18 193 148 2 
Percent 1.0 12.5 4.3 46.3 35.5 0.5 
 
Table A 4: "State your level of concern regarding the Portuguese economic situation" 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
Do Not 
Answer 
In the present 
Frequency 1 11 46 130 227 2 
Percent 0,2 2,6 11,0 31,2 54,4 0,5 
1 year ago 
Frequency 1 7 23 127 257 2 
Percent 0,2 1,7 5,5 30,5 61,6 0,5 
5 years ago 
Frequency 1 31 98 140 144 3 
Percent 0,2 7,4 23,5 33,6 34,5 0,7 
1 - Not concerned;...; 5 - very concerned 
 
Table A 5: "Regarding the future of the Portuguese economy you are...” 
 
Pessimistic 
Somewhat 
Pessimistic 
Neither Pessimistic 
not Optimist 
Somewhat 
Optimistic 
Optimistic 
Frequency 86 165 71 87 8 
Percent 20,6 39,6 17,0 20,9 1,9 
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Table A 6: Causes of the weak Portuguese economics performance 
 
Total 
No School of 
Thought Mainstream 
Non-
mainstream p value 
The international specialization of Portugal 
    
 
 
The increased international competition in the market for goods and services 0,492 0,530 0,462 0,476 0,846 
 
The increased international competition through dumping and counterfeiting 0,302 0,318 0,115 0,335 0,002 
 
The range and quality of products exported by Portuguese companies 0,329 0,235 0,308 0,386 0,290 
 
The lack of attractiveness of Portugal for Foreign Direct Investment 0,568 0,553 0,519 0,588 0,365 
 
The low propensity for internationalization of Portuguese business 0,590 0,523 0,442 0,661 0,003 
 
The introduction of Euro 0,343 0,265 0,250 0,408 0,034 
 
The choices of economic policy of The European commission 0,525 0,470 0,327 0,601 0,000 
 
The monetary policy of ECB 0,468 0,394 0,250 0,558 0,000 
 
The evolution of input prices 0,201 0,212 0,135 0,210 0,215 
 
The unfavorable international political situation  0,489 0,508 0,442 0,489 0,541 
 
Th international specialization of the Portuguese economy 0,480 0,455 0,404 0,511 0,164 
Firms' charactristics      
 
The small size of the firms since it makes it more difficult to access the credit 0,561 0,561 0,423 0,592 0,026 
 
The small size of the firms, as it makes it more difficult to process internationalization 0,650 0,614 0,673 0,665 0,914 
 
The small size of the firms, since it makes it more difficult to adopt new technologies 0,475 0,477 0,308 0,511 0,008 
 
The ownership structure of Portuguese firms 0,523 0,545 0,519 0,511 0,912 
 
The role of the family in the firm 0,424 0,439 0,385 0,425 0,595 
 
The low risk entrepreneurs 0,585 0,591 0,558 0,588 0,689 
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(…) 
 
Total 
No School of 
Thought Mainstream 
Non-
mainstream p value 
Economy's structural characteristics      
 
The dynamics of investments in a ICT era 0,384 0,356 0,288 0,421 0,079 
 
The quantity of physical infrastructure 0,146 0,136 0,058 0,172 0,038 
 
The quality of physical infrastructure 0,149 0,106 0,096 0,185 0,124 
 
The quality of infrastructure assets (bureaucracy, justice, regulators) 0,825 0,826 0,885 0,811 0,209 
 
The level of competition, the existence of other barriers to entry and income positions 0,602 0,561 0,712 0,601 0,138 
 
The high levels of corruption 0,638 0,636 0,596 0,648 0,482 
 
The low level of public investment in education 0,530 0,523 0,308 0,584 0,000 
 
The low level of education / professional formation 0,580 0,644 0,538 0,554 0,842 
Labor Market      
 
The negative effects (in terms of productivity) resulting from the reform of the labor market 0,283 0,288 0,115 0,318 0,003 
 
The low flexibility in the labor market 0,369 0,379 0,538 0,326 0,004 
 
The policy of wage moderation following the consensus phase 0,417 0,386 0,231 0,476 0,001 
 
The demographic dynamic 0,671 0,659 0,635 0,687 0,468 
 
The demand scarcity of human capital 0,578 0,553 0,423 0,627 0,007 
 
The supply scarcity of human capital 0,312 0,356 0,308 0,288 0,773 
 
The increase in emigration 0,427 0,447 0,250 0,455 0,007 
 
The behavior of unions 0,281 0,326 0,365 0,236 0,055 
Public sector      
 
The situation of public deficits 0,547 0,538 0,731 0,511 0,004 
 
The situation of public debt 0,667 0,659 0,808 0,639 0,020 
 
The policies undertaken for reduction of public debt 0,693 0,689 0,423 0,755 0,000 
 
The low efficiency of the public sector 0,628 0,667 0,712 0,588 0,099 
 
The inefficient management of public sector employees 0,626 0,621 0,654 0,622 0,671 
 
The reduction of public employees 0,225 0,220 0,077 0,262 0,004 
Note: the numbers represent the percentage of individuals whose answer was "strongly agree" or "agree." Grey cells indicate statistically significant differences in means 
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Table A 7: Policy proposals for improving the performance of the Portuguese economy (differences in means) 
  
All respondents Mainstream Non-mainstream 
No School 
of Thought 
Kruskall 
Walis Test 
- p value 
... to promote the internationalization of firms 0.868 0.846 0.888 0.841 0.396 
... to encourage private research 0.863 0.788 0.906 0.818 0.170 
... to proceed with simplifying/increasing the efficiency of the 
public sector 
0.832 0.846 0.833 0.826 0.812 
... to encourage academic research 0.827 0.712 0.880 0.780 0.002 
... to increase the quality of products 0.741 0.712 0.773 0.697 0.352 
... to modify the productive specialization of the economy 0.724 0.519 0.781 0.705 0.000 
... to encourage public research 0.722 0.558 0.807 0.636 0.000 
... to better connect firms within the territory 0.710 0.615 0.768 0.644 0.230 
... to create a consortium of small and medium firms 0.679 0.615 0.734 0.606 0.088 
... to reduce precariousness in the labor market 0.602 0.404 0.661 0.576 0.001 
... to increase the investment in ICT by firms 0.592 0.404 0.682 0.508 0.000 
... to increase public investment in strategic sectors 0.585 0.212 0.695 0.538 0.000 
... to incentivize the growth of the firms’ dimensions 0.540 0.346 0.575 0.553 0.003 
... to promote a more flexible labor market 0.412 0.519 0.361 0.462 0.340 
... to increase investment in physical infrastructures 0.252 0.077 0.318 0.205 0.000 
... to reduce the power of the unions 0.230 0.385 0.189 0.242 0.002 
... to proceed with further privatizations 0.144 0.346 0.107 0.129 0.000 
Notes: the numbers represent the proportion of individuals whose answer was "strongly agree" or "agree" with the proposal; grey cells indicate statistical significant differences in means; bold figures indicate the largest 
values 
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Table A 8: Correlation Between Mean Opinions on Causes by Schools of Thought 
 
Eclectic Evolutionary 
Institutionalist/ 
Neo-Inst 
New-
Keynesian 
Post-
Keynesian 
Marxist 
Neoclassical/ 
Mainstream 
Austrian/Neo-
Austrian 
Behaviourists Experimental Others 
Without a 
specific 
methodological 
orientation 
Eclectic 1 
    
            
 
Evolutionary 0.900* 1 
   
            
 
Institutionalist/Neo-Inst 0.902* 0.890* 1 
  
            
 
New-Keynesian 0.877* 0.862* 0.838* 1 
 
            
 
Post-Keynesian 0.644* 0.634* 0.575* 0.460* 1             
 
Marxist/ Sraffian/ Neo-Marxist 0.497* 0.426* 0.478* 0.292 0.659* 1           
 
Neoclassical/ Mainstream 0.694* 0.668* 0.691* 0.820* 0.072 0.011 1         
 
Austrian/Neo-Austrian 0.207 0.318* 0.202 0.270 -0.041 -0.135 0.427* 1       
 
Behaviourists 0.833* 0.781** 0.817* 0.849* 0.524* 0.488* 0.680* 0.218 1     
 
Experimental 0.795* 0.735* 0.781* 0.846* 0.409* 0.387** 0.681* 0.261 0.883* 1   
 
Other 0.567* 0.554* 0.437* 0.547* 0.671* 0.423* 0.232 -0.062 0.489* 0.498 1 
 
Without a specific 
methodological orientation 
0.868* 0.861* 0.856* 0.926* 0.456* 0.389** 0.855* 0.250 0.898* 0.843 0.541* 1 
Note: * (**) - Coefficient is significant at 1% (5%). Grey cells indicate values greater than 0.7 
 77 
Table A 9: Correlation Between Mean Opinions on Policy Proposals by Schools of Thought 
 
Eclectic Evolutionary 
Institutionalist/ 
Neo-Inst 
New-
Keynesian 
Post-
Keynesian 
Marxist 
Neoclassical/ 
Mainstream 
Austrian/Neo-
Austrian 
Behaviourists Experimental Others 
Without a 
specific 
methodological 
orientation 
Eclectic 1 
         
  
 
Evolutionary 0.981* 1 
        
  
 
Institutionalist/Neo-
Inst 
0.958* 0.960* 1 
       
  
 
New-Keynesian 0.956* 0.936* 0.954* 1 
      
  
 
Post-Keynesian 0.957* 0.937* 0.880* 0.895* 1 
     
  
 
Marxist/ Sraffian/ 
Neo-Marxist 
0.866* 0.861* 0.768* 0.796* 0.911* 1 
    
  
 
Neoclassical/ 
Mainstream 
0.560** 0.579** 0.728* 0.682* 0.364 0.260 1 
   
  
 
Austrian/Neo-Austrian 0.498** 0.437 0.597** 0.610* 0.354 0.199 0.774* 1 
  
  
 
Behaviourists 0.976* 0.976* 0.966* 0.968* 0.906* 0.856* 0.649* 0.521** 1 
 
  
 
Experimental 0.975* 0.973* 0.949* 0.952* 0.922* 0.861* 0.576** 0.490** 0.986* 1   
 
Other 0.931* 0.921* 0.847* 0.871* 0.952* 0.917* 0.363 0.329 0.911* 0.916* 1 
 
Without a specific 
methodological 
orientation 
0.934* 0.940* 0.984* 0.950* 0.839* 0.731* 0.777* 0.670** 0.963* 0.946* 0.818* 1 
Note: * (**) - Coefficient is significant at 1% (5%). Grey cells indicate values greater than 0.7 
 
